Of that knowlage, whiche maketh a wise man.

A disputacion Platonike.

1534

THE PROHEME OF SYR Thomas Eliot Knight.

GOd, vnto whom al mens hertis be opened, and the wyll of man speaketh, is my witnes, that to the desire of knowlage, whervnto I haue hitherto ben euer of my nature disposed, I haue soigned a constant intent to profite therby my naturall countrey: Whervnto accordyng to the sentence of Tully, we be most specially bounden. Wherfore after I had applied the more parte of my life in perusynge diligently euery auncient warke, that I mought come by, either greke or latine, conteinyng any parte of philosophie necessarie to the institucion of mans life in vertue, I haue endeuored my selfe to set forthe suche parte of my studie as I thought mought be profitable to them, whiche shulde hap-

pen to rede or here it. But diuers men rather scornyng the benefite than receyuing it thankfully, do shewe them selfes offended (as they saie) with my strange termes. Other finding in my bookes the thing dispreised, which thei do commende in dyng it. Like a galde horse abidynge no plaiffers, be alwaie gnappyng and kyckyng at suche examples and sentences, as thei doe feele sharpe or doe bite them, accomptyng to be in me no littell presumption, that I wyll in notyng other mens vices, correct Magnificat, sens other muche wyser men and better lerned than I, doe forbeare to write any thynge. And whiche is warse than all this: Some will malicionsly diuine or conjecte, that I write to the intent to rebuke some perticular persone, coueityng to bryng my warkes and afterwarde me into the indignation of some man in auctoritee.

Thus vnthankefully is my benefite recei-

receiued my good will consumed, and all my labours deuoured. Such is of some men the nature serpentine, that lappyng sweete milke thei conuerte it foorth with in to poyson, to distroie him, of whose liberalitee thei late had receiued it. Howe incomparably be these men vnlyke to the most excellent prince, our most dere soueraigne lorde: whose most roiall persone I hartily beseche god to preserue in longe life and honour. His highnesse benignely receyuynge my booke, whiche I named the Gouernour, in the redyng therof soone perceyued, that I intended to augment our Englyshe tongue, wherby men shoulde as well expresse more abundantly the thyng that they conceiued in their hertes (wherfore language was ordeined) hauyng wordes apte for the purpose: as also interprete out of greke, latine, or any other tonge into Englyshe, as sufficiently, as out of a-

ny one of the sayde tongues into an o-
ther. His grace also perceiued, that
through out the booke there was no
terme newe made by me of a latine or
frenche worde, but it is there declared
so plainly by one mene or other to a di-
ligent reder, that no sentence is therby
made derke or harde to bevnderstande.
Ne the sharpe and quicke sentences, or
the rounde and plaine examples set out
in the verses of Claudiane the poete,
in the seconde booke, or in the chapi-
ters of Affabilitee, Beneuolence, Be-
neficence, and of the diuersitee of flate-
rers, and in diuers other places, in a-
ny parte offended his highnes: but (as
it was by credible persones reported
vnto me) his grace not onely toke it in
the better parte, but also with princely
wordes full of maiestee, commended
my diligence, simplicitee and courage,
in that I spared none astate in the re-
bukyng of vice: which wordes ful of ve-
ry

ry nobilitee brought vnto my remembrance the vertuous Emperour Antonine, called for his wisdome Antonine the philosophier, who on a tyme herynge, that there was in the citee of Rome a playne and rude persone, whiche alwaie spake in the rebuke of all men, and neuer praised any man: he sent to hym, requiryng that he wolde come and speake with hym. And whan he was come, the Emperour had these woordes vnto hym. My frende, wherin haue I euer offended the? The fellow therwith sore abasshed, answered in this wise. Sir your hyghnes neuer offended me, that I am ware of.
Than art thou (sayde the Emperour) an vncurtoyse subiecte, that thou hast so longe dissembled with me, not tellyng vnto me my faultes. And after the Emperour reteyned hym still, gyuyng vnto hym dowble wages, commaundynge hym to vse his olde liber-

tee. And whan dyuers men merbay-led therat, he affirmed openly, that prin-cis vices were sooner espied by other men than by them selfes: and that there was muche more difficultee in remem-bryng them of their vice or lacke, than in extollyng and commendynge their vertues. So well did this moste no-ble Emperour consider, that his ex-aumple mought be more profitable vn-to the publyke weale of the citee, than any other thynge in his persone or dig-nitie.

¶ In lyke wise our moste dere soue-raygne lorde perfectly knew, that no writar ought to bee blamed, whiche writeth neither for hope of temporall reward, nor for any priuate disdaigne or malice, but onely of feruent zele to-warde good occupacion and vertue. Verdie man is not yet so confyrmed in grace, that he can not synne. And I suppose no prince thynketh hym selfe

to be exempte from mortalitee. And for as muche as he ſhall haue mo occaſions to fall, he ought to haue the mo friendes, or the more inſtruction to warne hym. And as for my parte I eſteſones do proteſt, that in no boke of my makyng I haue intended to touche more one man than an nother. For there be Gnathos in Spayne, as well as in Greece, Paſquilles in Englande as well as in Rome, Dioniſes in Germanie as well as in Sicile, Harpocrates in Fraunce as well as Aegypt, Ariſtippus in Scotlande as well as in Cyrena, Platos be fewe, and them I doubte where to fynde. And if men wyll ſeke for them in Englande, whiche I ſette in other places, I can not lette them. I knowe well ynoughe, dyuers doe delyte to haue theyr garmentes of the faction of other countreyes, and that whiche is moſte playne, is vnpleaſant: but yet it dothe

happen sometyme, that one man beynge in auctoritie, or fauour of his prince, beynge seene to weare some thyng of the olde facion: for the strangenes therof it is taken vp ageine with many good felowes. What I dooe meane, euery wyse man perceiueth.

Touchynge the title of my booke, I considered, that wisedome is spoken of, much more than vsed. For wherin it resteth, fewe men bee sure. The commune opinion is into three partes deuided. One sayeth, it is in muche lernynge and knowlage. An other affirmeth, that they, whiche dooe conducte the affayres of great princis or countreyes, bee onely wise men.

May saythe the thyrde, he is wyseste, that leste dothe meddle, and can sytte quietly at home, and tourne a crabbe, and looke onely vnto his owne busyneste. Fowe thei, whiche bee of the fyrste opinion, bee alwaie at variance.

For

For some doe chieflie extoll the studie of holie scripture (as it is reason) but while thei doe wrest it to agree with their wylles, ambicion, or vaine glorie, of the moste noble and deuoute lernyng, they do endeuour them to make it seruile and full of contencion. Some doe preferre the studie of the lawes of this realme, callyng it the onely studie of the publike weale. But a great numbre of persones, whiche haue consumed in sute more than the value of that, that thei sued for, in their angre do cal it a commune detriment. All though vndoubtedly the the verie selfe lawe trewely practised, passeth the lawes of all other countreies. In thinkyng on these sondrie opinions, I happened for my recreacion to reade in the booke of Laertius the life of Plato, and beholdyng the aunswere that he made to kynge Dionyse, at the firste sighte it seemed

to

to me to be verie dissolute and lacking the modestie, that belonged to a philosopher: but whan I had better examined it, therein appered that, whiche is best worthie to be called wisedome.

Wherfore to exercise my witte, and to auoide Idelnes, I toke my penne, and assayde, howe in expressyng my conceite, I mought profite to them, which without disdeine or enuie wolde often times reade it. If any man will thinke the booke to be verie longe, let him consider, that knowlage of wisedome can not be shortly declared. All be it of them, which be well willing, it is soone lerned: In good faithe sooner than Primero or Gleeke: Suche is the strange propretie of that excellent cunnynge, that it is sooner lerned, than taught, and better by a mans reason than by an instructour. Finally, if the reders of my warkis, by the noble example of our moste dere soueraigne lorde,

lorde, do iustly and louyngly interprete my labours, I durynge the residue of my life, wyll nowe and than set foorthe such frutes of my studie, profitable (as I truste) vnto this my countreie. And leuyng malicious reders with their incurable furie, I will saie vnto god the woordes of the Catholike Churche in the booke of Sapience: To knowe the good lorde is perfecte Iustice, And to knowe thy Iustice and vertue is the very roote of Immortalitee: And therin is the knowlage, that is verie wisedome. Sap. 15.

The fyrſt dialogue.

ARISTIPPVS. PLATO.

ARISTIPPVS.

Who is this man, whom I perceiue comyng hitherwarde? It ſemeth to bee Plato. Let me ſee. It is verily Plato him ſelfe. What meaneth it, that he is in this wiſe apparailed? His garmentes be very ſhorte, and more ſimple than he was accuſtomed to weare. Well, though there were ſome debate betweene vs in Sicile, yet will I ſalute him, and deſire him to ſhewe me the ſtate of al his affaires. For in wiſe men reſteth no malice, all though diuerſitee in opinions or forme of liuing cauſeth ſometyme contencion betwene them. Plato, thou art wel founden againe in this countrey. PLA. Gramercie Ariſtippus. But yet thou haſt ſaide truer than I wene thou arte ware of.

ARIS.

ARIS. Why, I knowe thee to be Plato, though thou be in this single apparaile. PLA. Ye that I suppose. But thou saidest, that I was well founden: And in deede thou saidst true after the commune opinion. For sens thou departidst from Sicile, I haue bene twise in the point to haue died, and also twise solde for a bondeman or slaue. Wherfore thou maiest with good reason saie, that I am well founden, that haue ben so often in perill to be losse. For commonly men do calle hym lost, whiche despaireth of his life: or of a free man is made a slaue. But whither that opinion be true or no, we shal speke more therof hereafter. Finally Airskippus (god bee thanked) I am well escaped. ARIS. I do not a litle meruaile of this that thou tellist me. For whan I went from kinge Dionyse, he mought not suffre, that thou mightest bee one houre from him.

More

Moreouer he regarded nothyng that was spoken, excepte it were by thy sentence approued. In the morynyng as soone as he was out of his bedde Plato was sent for. Vneth Dion and Aristomenes coulde gette of hym one houre in the daie, that thou moughtest teache them and other towardely gentilmen such parte of Philosophie as thei desired to lerne. Finally for the incomparable fauour that the kynge bare to thee, thou were had in the courte almoste in as muche reuerence, as the kinges owne person. And whan thou passidst by, noble men and other of the kinges householde, wolde rise quickely, and as a storme had fallen in their neckes, ducke to the with their heades vncouered: yet diuers in their mindes grutched at thy fortune, thinkinge that the great pleasure, that the kynge had in communynge with thee, withdrewe hym from heryng of

other

other men, of whom there was a great noumbre, which had, some commune, some priuate cauſis to treate of with hym, if thei mought by thine abſence haue founde opportunitee. PLA. Thou ſayeſt trouth Ariſtippus, and that perceiue I more clerely now, than I did before thoſe thinges hapned vnto me. But now wyll I recite the my ſtorie.

¶ Soone after that thou hadſt optained licence of the kyng to go vnto Athenes, he became wonderfull ſtourdie, in ſo muche as no man mought blame any thing, wherin he delited: nor praiſe any thinge, which was contrarie to that, that he vſed. And that ſobre and gentyll maner in heringe ſundre opinions reaſoned before him, wherto of a cuſtome he was wont to prouoke the and me, was laid aparte, and ſuppoſing that by hering of ſundrie philoſophers diſpute and reaſon, he him ſelfe had attained to a more perfecte knowlage than any

other that spake vnto him, he began to haue all other men in contempte. And as it were Iupiter, who (as Homere saithe) with a winke made all heauen to shake, he wold with a terrible countenance so visage them, whom he knew wold speake their opinions freely, that thei shulde dreede to saie any thinge, which thei knewe shulde be contrarie vnto his appetite. Notwithstandyng on a time he willed me to declare in his presence the maiestie of a kynge, and howe muche he excelled and was aboue the astate of any other persone: which requeste I gladly herde, thinking to haue had good opportunitie to warne him of his blindnesse and folie. Therfore I began to commende the perfect image or figure of god, whiche was manifeste in the astate of a kyng, who ruled him selfe and his people for the vniuersall weale of them all. And whan I had described his auctorites

and

and preeminence by excellencie of his vertues: proving that nothyng moughte be amended, but by that whiche surmounted, or was better than it, which was to be corrected, as vice by vertue, falshode by truthe, wronge by iustice, folie by wisedome, ignorauncе by lernyng, and such other like. Afterwarde I studiously did sette out a Tyranne in his propre colours, who attendeth to his owne priuate commoditee.

Here at kynge Dionise frowned and became angrie. And interruptyng my woordes, saied vnto me: This is a tale of olde fooles, that can not be otherwise occupied. And I aunswered agayne, that those woordes of his, sauored of Tyrannie. ARIS. I meruaile Plato, that thou spakest, so vnaduisedly: I doe meane, sens thou knewest well inough kyng Dionise nature and disposicio, that thou perceiuing him to be mooued, woldest so sodainly imbraide hym

of his wordes so dispitefully. PLA. Well as for that, we shall reason therof hereafter. Finally I was well auised what I wolde speake: but nowe will I tell furthe my tale, what hapned afterwarde to me.

¶ Sir the kynge beyng inflamed with furie, furthwith wolde haue slaine me. But beyng intreated importunately by Dion and Aristomenes, he withdrewe his sentence, not withstandyng to the intente that he wolde be auenged, he gaue me to Polidis, who was than Ambassadour sente to hym from the Lacedemonians. Who had me with hym to Aegina, and there solde me. Nowe a littell before there was an ordinance made in that Countrie, that if any man of Athenes came into that Ile, he shoulde immediately lose his heades: whiche ordinance was made by Charmander than beinge capitaine of that countraie, who espiyng me, and

know-

knowyng who I was, caused me to be apprehended and brought vnto the place of iudgement, requiring that on me his said ordinance mought be put in execucion. Wherunto I made no defence, but takyng myne aduenture patiently, and contemnyng deth, as it became me, I abode my iudgement. At the last one, either in despite, or of purpose to saue therby my life, speking openly, and with a loude voyce, sayde to Charmander and the Iudges: The ordinãce, if it be wel perceiued, is made against men of Athenes: but Plato (that is here) is a philosopher. Whiche wordes, as it hapned, were well taken and laughed at of all them that were present. And therwith thei discharged me of the saide penaltie. all be it for the hostilitee that was than betweene them and Athenes, thei wolde not lette me freely departe, but decreed, that I shulde eftesoones be solde. There hap-

ned to be at that time Anicerís, whiche dwelleth at Cyrenas, a man well lerned, who paied for me. xx.li. and furthwith deliuerynge to me his seruant, whom thou beholdist here, hath sent me as thou seest home to my countrei: The garmentes that I weare, he that bought me and Polidis, toke from one of his slaues, and gaue them vnto me, whan he had taken from me myne apparaile, that I brought out of Sicile: whiche as thou knowest, was right honest and competent. Notwithstanding neither the crueltee of kyng Dionise, nor the malicious decree of the Aeginites mought remoue my courage from vertue and truthe, no more than the vyle sellyng of me, nor this vile habite of a slaue or bondeman maie chaunge mine astate or condicion.

¶ But now Aristippus, I will answere thee to that, wherein thou semest to blame me of imprudence or lightnes:

sai-

saiyng, thou meruailest that I wolde speake so vnauisedly, sens I knewe the nature of kynge Dionyse and his disposicion. Remembrest thou not, that my comyng into Sicile was to beholde the wonderfull mountaines, which doue sende out of the toppes of them great flames of fire and smoke, and to inserche out the naturall causes therof? And that although the kynge sent often times for me, yet wolde I not come vnto him, for as muche as through all Greece he was named a Tyran At the laste he sente vnto me Dion, whiche is a man, as thou knowest, of honour and dignitee almost incomparable: who said vnto me, that the kyng was incredibly meued with desyre to se me, for the great fame (as he affirmed) of wisedome & knowlage, al though I my seife knew no such thyng, to be in me. And moreouer the same Dion shewed me, y he supposed much profite shuldhappen

to the realme of Sicile by our metyng and communication, the kinge presently beholdyng and heryng in me that, whereof he hath so great expectacion: that is to saie (as I moughte vse Dions woorde) vertue and wisedome. ARI. In deede I herde not onely Dion, but also diuers other repoꝛte euerythyng as thou haste spoken. PLATO. Than thou knowest, that the kynge feruently desired to see me. ARIS. That is truthe. PLA. And moꝛeouer to speake also with me. ARI. Ye verily. PLA. Because he herde good repoꝛte of me. ARI. So it appereth. PLA. Supposist thou Aristippus, that the repoꝛte of wisedome and vertue is good in a Tyrans opinion? ARI. Ye as longe as he thinketh, that nothyng that is spoken oꝛ doone, repugneth agaynst his affections. PLAT. What afterwarde? ARI. He accompteth it but a vanitee, iudgeyng as sicke men, nothyng

thyng to be good, that agreeth not with the sent of his appetite. PLA. Nowe in good faith though thou thy selfe hast a delicate mouthe, and thy taste distempred, yet I can the thanke: for nowe thou saiest truely. But it semeth to the, that whan Dionise sent for me, he than thought that wisedome and vertue wer good, and that I hauyng them (as it was reported) was a good man: and therfore he desyred to see me. ARI. Ye so it semeth. PLA. And men do desyre to see a thinge either for the beautie therof, whiche causeth them to loue it, or for the strangenesse therof, wherby thei be meued to wonder at it, or for commoditee that thei before haue receiued by it. ARI. I thynke thou saiest truely. PLA. But excepte I be deceiued by false mirrours, or like to chaungeable louers, whiche do mislike the beautie, wherof thei haue daily fruicion, perchaunce I contempne that in

my selfe, whiche I wold praise in an o-
ther, I am neither in beautie nor perso-
nage to be cõpared to an infinite noum
bre of ponge men, which be in Greece,
and also in this royalme of Sicile. Be-
sides that, I am now aboue the age of
fourtie yeres, and haue also trauailed
in diuers cuntreis to seke for wisdome,
wherby the forme and strengthe of my
body is not a litell appaired. Moreo-
uer thankes be to god, I suppose there
is neither stature nor forme in my per-
sonage so ferre out of iuste measure or
facion, where at any man can fynde
occasion to wonder or meruaile. And
as for any commoditee that kyng Dio-
nise hath receiued of me, before my co-
minge vnto hym, I can not perceiue
what it shulde bee sens, I neuer wrate
vnto hym, nor neuer before was in
his companie: what thinkest thou was
than the cause that he desyred to see
me? A R. What els, but to the entent

that

that hauing thee in his presence, he mought in demaundyng of thee, here that declared by thy mouth: wherfore thou were called a wise man: and yf thou dideſt expresse the same in thy demenure and countenaunce, which helpeth muche (as I mought saie) to the ratifiyng of good opinion. PLA. What saieſt thou? Dooeth demeanure and countenaunce ratifie the opinion of wisdome? ARI. Ye verily so thinke I. PLA. What meaneſt thou thereby? ARI. For accordyng to the profeſſion or qualitee, wherin men haue opinion that wisedome doeth reſt, so ought to be the forme of liuing, countenaunce, and geſture: whiche ioigned all to gether maketh one whole and perfecte harmonie, whiche sendeth in to the hertes of the beholders and herers a voluptee or feruent dilectation. PLA. I can the thanke Ariſtippus, thou haſte nowe declared to haue ben (as I was)

the

the disciple of Socrates. And if thou woldest extende voluptee no further (whiche thou so muche praisest) than thou hast doone nowe, there shuld neuer be contencion betwene vs, but folowing directly the doctrine and steppes of our maister Socrates, not onely we two shulde agree in our opinions, and forme of liuing, which shuld make that harmony, wherof thou spekest. But moreouer all mē that know vs both, by the vnitee of our doctrine shulde bee brought to insue one confirmitee of liuyng, or at the leste couaite to folowe it, wherin shuld be a perfecte harmonie. The whole quiar singyng in one tune. Where, by the discorde of our two doctrines, men doubting which of vs two speaketh most truely, I commendyng the voluptee or perfect dilectation, whiche is in knowlage, thou preferring the voluptee of the body and senses, that be deuided into sondrie o-

Discorde in doctrines.

pinions:

pinions: some extolling myne admonitions as more pure, and separate from the nature of beastes, and therfore approching nere vnto diuinitee: other more sensuall, and hauing lasse reason, do imbrace thy persuasions, as more delectable, calling thy doctrine more naturall and of lasse arrogance: many there bee, whiche doe couaite learning and wisedome, but hauing not their myndes sufficiently purged of affectes, but either by nature, or by yll bringyng vp, inclinyning alwaie to pleasaunt motions or appetites of the bodie, they admitte them gladly. But while they studie to folowe bothe our doctrines: they of all other doe make the greatest discorde and vnperfect musike. For whan they woulde seeme to extolle the dilectation in knowlage, they auaunce it meruailously in their disputacions and reasonynges: but in pursuing their affectes and wan-

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ton appetites thet destroie their first opinion: And vainly do inforce them to make a concorde betwene that, whiche of their owne nature be most repugnant. Whiche of their own nature be most repugnant. Which discorde dissolueth that harmonie, wherof thou spakest: for men beholdyng in one person suche instabilitee, they semblablie doe wander in sondrie opinions, nowe praising one, and vsinge an other, as occasion happeth. But here will I leaue to dispute any more in this matter, lest I mought happen to refricate the late variance betwene the & me: and now wil I returne againe wher I was.

¶ I trowe thou saidest, that accordyng to the profession or qualitee, wherin men haue opinion, that wisdome doeth reste, so ought to be the forme of liuing, countenance, and gesture. In good faithe I suppose thou sayest truely. For if Lais the harlot, in whome thou takest

kest pleasure in fulfilling thy carnal appetite, shulde shew hir selfe to thee in sluttish and vile apparaile, hir head vnkempt, hir face and handes soiled & imbrued with greee of the potage, that she had eaten, and hir legges & feete spotted with mire, beholdyng thee with a sturdie countenance: thou shuldest not be much moued to imbrace & kisse hir, all though she spake to the wordes wanton and amorouse, and after the custome of harlots, praise thee with rebukes, & rebuke the with praises. In likewise if Diogenes, who (as thou knowest) contemneth all thyng, saue onely pouertee, wolde stande in the market place with his beарde cleane shauen, & his heare trussed vp in a caule of golde, and hauing on his fingers ringes with diamandes and rubies, and on his legges fyne hosen well garded, and shoen of the trimmest facion, And beсause perchance it is winter, and therfore the wea-

Diogines

weather is colde, hauing a panne with hot coles standing at his elbowe: If he wolde rebuke the people of to much curiositee and delicate liuing, and praise wilfull pouertee, and apparaile, that onely seruen for necessitee, also woulde exhorte them to contemne or despise all riches and honour, and to imbrace painfulnesse: Thinkest not thou, that thei wold laugh him to scorne, and accompt hym for a dissarde, or with to much study fallen in to a frensie? ARI. Yes by my trouth, for it were a marualous folie. PLA. And why supposest thou? ARI. For the fresshe apparaile and riches, that he sheweth, openly declareth to all men, that he therin deliteth and taketh pleasure. And that wherin a man doth delite, in delityng therin he praiseth it: than is it not a great foolishnes to praise and dispraise, as it were in one instante? That is to saie, in vse to commende a thinge openly

ly, and in wordes to dispraise it expres-
ly. And it shuld seeme to the beholders,
that he exhorteth men to contemne ri-
ches, that he mought be riche onely.
And that he persuadeth them to sustaine
colde and other paines, that he mought
take his ease and syt by the fire, whiles
other men laboured. Wherfore if they
regarded littell his counsaile, thei were
not to be blamed. PLA. Yes, his coun-
saile perchance were to be considered,
whether it were expedient or no: but
surely his persone and discrection were
to be littell esteemed. Nowe Aristip-
pus, thou thynkest that kynge Dionyse
desyred to see me, to the intent that he
mought beholde, if in my countenance
and forme of liuyng I did expresse that
thinge, wherfore he herde me commen-
ded. And it seemeth, ỹ therin the kynge
declared hym selfe to bee a veray wise
man, that he trusted more to the acte,
than to woordes or opinion. ARI. Ye

truly he hath a sharpe witte, and in that a man mought well praise his imagination. PLA. Than what thinkest thou Aristippus? If I shulde haue laied a parte myne owne apparaile, and haue bought such as thou wearest, garded and decked with golden buttons, supposest thou not, that whan I cam to his presence, and that he sawe me, in suche wise apparailed, he wolde thinke that I would speake of the delectation that is felte in medlyng with faire women and pleasant: or in the sendze diuersitees of sweete sauours, and tastes of meates, that the cooke hath well seasoned: and in other lyke thinges, in whose effectes thou determinest to be perfecte felicitee? Than because he hath beforе herde the dispute as abundantly therof as any mans witte mought imagin, he wouldе litell esteme my commyng, and thinke the reporte, whiche was made of me, to bee false. But if he

wolde

would vouchesafe to tarie, than if I disputed of fortitude, temperance, and other lyke vertues, and therwith exhorted him and other princes, to abstaine and be continente, blaming their auarice, letherie, and other dissolute maners, with their curiositee and superfluouse apparaile: Supposest thou not, that he wolde laugh at me, and in mockage bede me change mine apparaile? ARI. Maie peraduenture he woulde commaunde one to fetche for you a furred hoode to saue with your honestie.

PLA. Ah kynge Dionyse is beholding vnto the. For thou woldest, that men shoulde thinke, that he were of great modestie. But what if before that he herde me speake, he had caused me to sitte with hym at souper, and there beheld me feede errantly, peruslyng all the delicate disshes: and therto dranke stoutely of euery cuppe that was offred me: and after souper, with

suche wenches as were presente, deuise wantonly, and also plate and dalie, exceedyng the termes of honestie, but whan I beheelde hym do the semblable, I wolde than commende sobrenesse, and dispraise glotony: commende exceedingly continence, and dispraise vehementlywanton daliance, and lecherie: howe much trowest thou wolde he than sette bynie? ARI. As much as of a good foole, that shuld make him merie. For he wold take all thy wordes but for iapery. PLA. I weene thou saiest truly. Nowe lette vs inserche somewhat on the other parte. Whan Dion brought me vntill him, and that he beheelde me cladde in apparaile conuenient and semely to my profession, neither scant nor superfluous, neither moste rude, nor yet sumptuous, my countenance therto equiualent, which (be it spoken without any boste) with great studie and diligence, I haue prepa-

red

red to haue alwaie in ſuche a temperance, that it ſhal neuer be founden diſſolute or light, nor yet frowarde or ſturdie, thinkeſt thou that he had than good opinion of me? and thought that the wiſdome and vertue was in me, which men had reported? ARI. Ye vndoubtedly, and therfore he reioiced muche at thy comyng. PLA. For any other thynge troweſt thou, than becauſe I was wiſe and vertuous, as he iudged by mine apparaile and countenance? And that he hoped to here of me ſome wiſedome declared? ARI. No truely, but euen for that cauſe onely. PLA. On my faithe Ariſtippus, thou well doeſt deſerue the great giftes and benefites, that thou haſte receiued of kynge Dionyſe, ſens thou ſo diligently haſt affirmed him to be the louer of wiſdome. For in that, that he couaited to here it declared, he deſyred it, and no man wolde deſyre that thynge that he loueth

not. AR. So I suppose. PLA. But yet hereafter it shall appiere contrarie: But for this time admitte thy persuasion of kyng Dionise to be true, that he favored wisedome and vertue, and that he hoped to here it declared better by me than by other. I knowe he sittyng & studiously applyng his eares to giue me good audience, shuld here me commende the pleasure that is in sumptuous and pleasant houses, in riche apparaile and tapestries, in plentie of goodly and faire concubines, in abundance of delicate meates and drinkes, and heapyng vp great treasour of money and iewelles: thinkest not thou, that I spake contrarie to his expectacion, whiche he had of me by the reporte of my living, confirmed by myne apparaile and countenaunce, as thou late affirmedst? Thinkest thou, that he wolde not haue thought, that either I had mocked or flattered hym, if he hath

so

so sharpe a witte and quicke inuencion, as thou doest suppose him to haue: and therfore haue caused me to be expelled out of his palaice, as a counterfaite bisarde or spie? Or aunswering me, that of suche thinges as I commended, he had more knowlage and experience, than I: and therfore in vaine I laboured to declare that to hym, which I knew much lasse than he him selfe dyd-Saiynge, that he couaited to here of me, what wisedome was, whereof he had herde so many diuers opinions: And wherin, as the reporte was made vnto hym, I was instructed sufficiently, wherfore he wolde require me to declare that onely vnto hym, whiche he supposed I knewe better than he did.
ARI. It is very lykely that he would haue done so: PLATO. If thou hadst than bene there Aristippus, wouldest thou haue counsailed me to haue resisted that gentyll princis requeste, who with

ſuche humanitee, as thou haſt herde of, ſo muche deſyred to ſee me, and to here me ſpeake? ARI. Nate that woulde I not. PLA. Than thou woldeſt that I ſhulde ſatiſfie his deſyre? ARI. Ye truely. PLA. After that he had ſene me, what remained? ARI. To here thee ſpeake. PLA. Any otherwiſe than he had opinion of me? ARI. No verily. PLA. And accordyng as mine appa-raile, and countenance pretended, ſo I ſhuld do? ARI. Accordyng. PL. Not diſturpyng thy profeſſion, in perſuading to him thynges that were delectable, or praiſing the diſſolute forme of his ly-uing not onely contrarie to mine appa-raile and countenaunce, but alſo whi-che I my ſelfe do abhorre, and haue al-waie reproued openly. ARI. No, that diſſimulation were to foule and appa-rant, and ſhulde haue ſette hym (as thou ſaidſt while ere) in great diſplea-ſure with thee, ſuppoſyng that thou

hadst mocked him. PLA. Than woldest thou not, that I shuld haue vsed any dissimulation: for thou supposest, that kynge Dionyse wolde haue bene therwith displeased. It seemeth therfore that thou concludest, that I shulde tell him truthe, and accordyng to my profession. ARI. Ye so god helpe me. PLA. Thou knowest well Aristippus, that my profession hath euer bene, That no man is happie, excepte he be wise and also good, and that felicitie is in wisedome and goodnes. And contrarie wise, that thei which be ignorant and yll, be vnhappy, and that ignorance and sin is in felicitee and miserie. ARI. I knowe well thou haste ben in that tale yet continually. PLA. What saiest thou Aristippus, is not wisedome knowlage? Or what thynge is it els? ARI. Why doest thou aske me that question, wherof no man maketh any doubte? PLA. For I feared leste thou

Alcib. 1.
Happie.
Felicitee.
Ignorãce.

wouldest haue saide, that the vsing of thinges delectable had bene wisedome onely. ARIS. But not without knowlage, wherof proceedeth election. For than shuld I haue affirmed, that a horse, which delyteth in eating, a dogge in hūting, a gote in lecherie, did it by wisedome: wherby I should proue my selfe to be foolishe and ignorant. Moreouer, I am of that opinion, that a wise mā liueth not alwai in voluptee or pleasant delectation, but that for the more parte he is so affectioned. Also without knowlage the troubles & impedimētes, wherby delectation is letted, mai not be cōprehended to be eschewed. PL. Well than, although in the affecte of delectation we two disagree, thou preferring the dilectations of the flesshe before the delectations of the soule: I condemning al such affection do vtterly seuer it from wisedome: yet we do agree, that knowlage is euer in a wise man. But

what

what knowlage meaneſt thou? The knowlage of a good horſe from a bad, a whole ſhepe from a cothed, or ſuche other like? Or els the knowlage, howe to builde a faire houſe, or how to ſette trees, that in a litteli ſpace of time thou maiſte haue a faire orcharde? ARI. That knowlage is good. PLA. Yea and proceedeth of a ſharpe wit, but yet it is not that knowlage that maketh him, that hath it, to be a wiſe man. ARIS. I ſuppoſe not. PLA. What ſaieſt thou by him, that findeth the meanes to gather great ſummes of money, offices, or great poſſeſſions with litteli labour: thinkeſt thou not him to haue that knowlage, whiche we call wiſedome? ARI. It approcheth very nigh, but I dare not affirme it to be ſo, becauſe I ſee daiely, that the moſte parte of thoſe perſons happeth to ſuche thinges more by fortune than by their owne merites or Indultrie. PL. On my faith I loue

lone thee Aristippus, for now thou saiest truely. What then, whiche from a poore astate do come to great rule and auctoritee, shall I name them all wise men? CARI Muche lasse than the other. For besides that that fortune hath also there ne littell portion, it moreouer dependeth not on the power, witte, or diligence of him, that cometh to auctoritee, but wholly on the wyll of a second person, that is to saie, of him that promoteth him to it. Wherfore haue he much witte or none, as he shall like or content the person, that maie aduance hym, so shall he come to auctoritee. Wherfore sens it happeth not onely of his own studie, I see no cause why to call him a wise man. PLA. Thou speakest very well and reasonablie, but what suppoisest thou them to be, whiche in euery matter, that is meued, can reason feately, makyng men that do here them, wonder at their conueiance, though

though it bee sometyme farre from the purpose? be not thei wise men? And that thyng that thei haue, is it not the veray knowlage, that maketh wisdome?
ARI. No, but it is a good parte of inuention, whiche cometh of witte. All be it because that, which thei do reason is neuer certaine, it is rather opinion than wisedome: and also that maner of prompte reasonyng hapneth more of nature than studie, and therfore it is more commended of vulgare persones or ignorante: than of them, whiche be of a ripe and perfect iudgement. PLA. Perchance thou saist truely: yet maie it also be in the, that be wise, not as wisdome it selfe, but as a setter furthe of wisedome to hym that hereth, lyke as the painter hath the veray image in his myndе, but whan he wold, that other men shuld perceiue it, he on a table with sondry colours painteth it, and setteth it furthe: And yet if the peinter

do not before he worketh, and in paintyng, conceiue in his minde the wholl proporcion of the image, whan it is printed, it shal lacke his perfection. And although the freshe colours and vernish maketh it pleasant to the eies of the communc people, and them that be ignorant, yet to good warkemen, and to them that haue beholden many parfect peces, and delited therin, the imperfection of the worke is shortly perceiued: euen so knowlage, wherin is wisdome, beyng ones truely had, if it bee well set furthe with eloquence and reason, it shall the better please and profite the herers. But if he that speaketh, doo lacke that knowlage, howe so euer the beautie of his woordes and reason shall content the eares of them that be ignorant, yet therof shall come to them but littell profite. And to them that haue tasted some thinge of that knowlage, the errour or lacke shall

soone

soone be espied. But now what suppo-
sest thou is the knowlage, whiche we
haue all this while talked of? and that
wherin that wisedome is, for the which
kynge Dionyse desyred to see me, and
to heare me speake, and the whiche ac-
cordyng to my profession, apparaile,
and countenance, and to the expectaci-
on that he had of me, I declared vnto
him? ARI. I wot not Plato, therfore
I praie the tell me to shorten our com-
munication. PLA. I am content, but
yet with a condition, that is to saie,
whan I demaunde of the any question,
thou shalt speake euen as thou thinkest,
without inforcinge any reason to main
teine therwith thine olde opinon.
ARI. Therto I assent for this time,
sens there be no mo here but we two,
for our seruantes be now out of hering
PLA. Thou remembrest, that it is
agreed by vs bothe, that neither the
knowyng of good cattell or badde,

or

or how to plante well, and to make a faire orcharde, ne the deuisyng of faire houses and buildinges, nor the in creasing of goodes or possessions, or the opteinyng of great offices or dignities, or the sharpe witte and quickenes in reasoning: is that knowlage, wherin is wisedome? What saiest thou to other sciences or craftes, whiche are not reversed? ARI. I suppose the same of them all generally. For of eueriche of them I haue knowen some men to be littell better than naturall fooles? and out of the feate, which thei daily exercised, vneth perceiuyng that, whiche we call commune reason. PLA. Ye, and that wars is, liuyng bestly and out of all order, whiche is the greattest and moste euident token of ignorance, whiche is contrarie and ennemie to knowlage. But nowe Aristippus, for as muche as longe disputaciou prouoketh tediousenes, me semeth, if we brought

some varietee or chaunge in the order of our communication, it shold refreth both our wittes. ARI. what meanest thou therby? Take hede that we renne not out of our matter. PLAT. No, doubte thou not therof, I shall provide well enough therfore. But herke I will tell the nowe, what I meane. we have hitherto spoken of knowlage, wherin is Sapience: but what or wher in it is, we yet perceive not, but be now in sekyng. What, and if we now used the waie of a cunning peinter, which in makyng an ymage of a very faire woman naked, to the intent that he will sette out the figure perfectly, and (as I mought speake like a workeman) by prospective: that it maie seme to the beholders therof meike lively, and therfore the bodie and membres shuld shew to them as rounde and full, as it were imbosed and wrought in tymber, metall, or stone? he maketh the grounde

of this worke of the depest blacke colour that he maie come by, whiche the more intentifly that a man doeth beholde it, the more liuely or quicke shall the fleshly colour of the image apere to the eie, & the proporcio seme more rounde, and in the forme of a bodie liuing. In semblable wise I intendyng to set out a perfect figure of knowlage, if I treate fyrste of Ignorance, and makyng that to be well perceiued, I suppose it shall not be inconuenient: but the true proportion of knowlage afterwarde, whan I shall goe about to declare it, shall be more apparant and easie to be vnderstande, and the varietie in our communication shall make the matter more plesant. ARI. In good faith Plato thy deuise liketh me wonderful well. Wherfore saie on a goddes name. PLA. Is Ignorance any other thyng Aris. than lacke of knowlage? AR. No surely. PL. Than nothing is so contrarie to knowlage

Ignorance.

lage as ignorance. ARI. Nothing. PL. Is a brute beast inferior to mankinde by any thing so much as by ignorance? For in bodily strength, long life, agilitee & swiftnes, ther be diuers bestes, which ser doe excede him, onely by ignorance thei be al inferiors vnto him. AR. Thou were wōt also to sai, ỳ bestes lacked the soule that mā hath, which is immortall. PL. That is true. But thou must remē bre, that the soule with the bodie maketh the man. For if the bodie lacked a soule, though it had life, yet were it no mā but a beast. And that the figure maketh not a man, it apereth by those beastes, which be called satyri, fauni, hippocentauri, & diuers other which be founden in Affrike, hauing some the visage, some ỳ whol figure of mans bodie. And in the same soule, whiche maketh the man, & without it man is not nor maie be, hath nothing lasse in him than ignorance, & if a man seme to be ignorant, it

hapneth neuer a whitte of the ſoule, but of the groſnes of the bodie, which is beſtiall, as of the ſame matter and ſubſtaunce that bzute beaſtes bee of, whiche will not let the ſoule, that is of a diuine ſubſtance, to ſhewe the effectes and diſpoſicion of hir nature, which is onely knowlage: the lacke wherof being cauſed by the obiecte oz lette of the bodie, is nothing but ignozance. Likewiſe as a thicke and great cloude, couering the ſoonne, wyll not lette hym to ſende furthe his beames on the earthe, wherby the erthe lacketh light, and that lacke is called derkeneſſe. Now laie aparte all artes and ſciences, which (as thou knoweſt well enough) were founden by mannes inuencion and experience, longe after that man was created: and ſet mā in the ſame eſtate that he was in before the ſaid artes and ſciences were inuented: yet were he than a man as he is nowe, And lacketh not

any

any thyng, wherby he is named a man. wherin nowe doth appere the diuersitee betwene him and a brute beaste? Tell me nowe as thou thinkest? ARI. what els but in the same thynge, for the whiche beastes be surnamed brute. PLA. Thou saiest truth: but yet leste I be deceiuid by the diuersitee of our two vnderstandynges: I praie the tell me in fewe wordes, what by the saide worde, *brute*, is signified. ARI. Mary agreed: I take that it signifieth grosse, insensate, lackyng capacitee of knowlage, finally it amounteth to as much as ignorant. PLA. By the faith of my bodie thou haste made an exposicion verie compendiouse and elegant. Than be we bothe agreed, that ignorance maketh the diuersitee betwene a beast and a man. But what ignorance I praie the? ignorance in buildyng of houses, makyng of cloth, or workyng of mettall, or peraduenture ignorance

in grammer, or logike, or makyng of verſis, or els playyng on the ſhalmes or the lute? Doth ignorance in any of theſe cauſe the diuerſitee? AR. It ſemeth nay. For thou didſt preſuppoſe, that a man were in the ſame eſtate, that all men were in, or euer any artes or ſciences were founden, & than of that thyng that is not, it were folie to ſuppoſe any ignorance. PLA. Thou ſpekeſt not muche a myſſe. But yet for an other cauſe, Ignorance in any of the ſaide artes or ſciences doeth not make the diuerſitee that we nowe ſpeake of. For if it ſhuld ſo do, than who ſo euer lacked any of the ſaid artes or ſciences, it ſhuld folow, that he were ignorant, and therfore he were no man but a beaſt. And alſo bees, silke wormes, and ſpidars ſhuld not compare with vs only, but ſhoulde ſeeme alſo to excede vs in knowlage. For as much as without any inſtructour or teacher, thei at the firſt, without

leſſe

losse of any thinge, can perfectly make ware, hony, silke and copwebbes: whiche no man can do like, nor by none invencion can atteine to the knowlage, how it ought to be done. And as for the bee and the spynner, who so euer studiously do beholde their warke, he shall see therin suche order, that beside the office of nature he shall wonder at the equalitee or iustnes of proporcion, so exactly obserued, that none artificer can amende it. But now Aristippus sens this is not the ignorance, that any of vs both haue mente hitherto, I praie the what Ignorance supposest thou it is, that maketh this diuersitee? A R. I suppose it be this, that a beast hath not the knowlage of him selfe & of other, in the diuersitee of their kindes. For my horse knoweth not that he is a horse, no more he doeth that he is a beaste and I a man: neither the bee, at whose industrie thou hast so muche wondred, whan

the hiue is broken, he knoweth not whether it be a man or a beaste that taketh his honie combes, and putteth hym out of his lodgeyng, wheron he hath bestowed so muche labour. Nor the spaniel, that is so ialouse ouer his maister, hath not the knowlage, whether his maister be a man or els a beast as he is. Contrarie wise, a man knoweth, that he is a man, and knoweth also euery other beaste in his kynde. PLA. Thou comest nigh to the point Aristippus. But beware that thou be not deceiued, if after Pythagoras doctrine, whan men be dead their soules entre in to horses, lions, and swine. And after many yeres trauailyng they retourne againe to be men: Than there mought be in thy horse the soule of kynge Sardanapalus, wherby thy horse mought know what thou art and him selfe to. ARI. Thou aduaunceste me highly Plato, whan thou supposeste me to ryde on a kynge,

kynge, and on so great a kyng, as Sardanapalus was, whiche reigned ouer Assyria and Babylon. PLA. Thou art worthie to haue no worse horse Aristippus, sens by thy profession thou art denied prelat of al voluptee or wanton appetites: vnto whom much greatter princis than Sardanapalus was, haue bene knowen to be seruantes. ARI. No peraduenture than of thy sower and vnpleasant vertues woulde gladly be folowers. PLA. But nowe that I remembre me, thou nedest not to be aferde Aristippus, for thou art neuer the more deceiued. In good faithe thy horse hath yet no more knowlage than a very horse hath in deede. ARIS. What meanest thou thereby? PLA. For whan Sardanapalus liued, and was kyng of Assyria, he than knew not hym selfe. For abandonyng not onely the maiestee of a kyng, but also the office of a man, he lefte the companie of

men, and sat continually with his concubines atyred in the fourme of a woman, spinnyng on the rocke, and cared for nothyng, but how he mought excell all his wenches in wantonnes. Now sens he than beyng in the fourme of a man, so much forgat what he was, thinkest thou, that there be in him lasse ignorance now, that he is in the fourme of a horse? ARI. Nai in good faith, but much more. And because thou saiest so Plato, I haue euen the fondest horse that euer man rode on. For whan he was yonge, he was so mare woode, that no man mought ride him. And nowe that he is olde, & that I pitiyng him dose vse to ryde on him some small iourneies: by my trouthe whan we be in the brode highe waie, if he see iii. mules of, a rase of mares, he will in spite of my teethe leue the waie and go to them, whan he is not able to ren, nor bridell nor spoure maie holde him.

And

And yet whan he commeth thither, ſawynge onely neighyng and kickyng, he can do nothyng. And therfore it may wel be (if Pythagoras doctrine be true) that the ſoule of Sardanapalus is in ſorell my horſe. But if I knewe it for certaine, by god I wolde haue the fayreſt mares that any where mought be gotten for hym. PLA. Nowe on my faithe that is merily ſpoken. But in deede Ariſtippus, the ſaide ſentence of pythagoras ought not to be taken as it is written without any other expoſition no more than his myſticall counſailes called Simbola. As, *cut not the fire with a ſwoorde*, Leaue *not ouer the balance*, Taſte *nothynge, whiche hathe a blacke tayle*, and ſuche other lyke, whiche thou haſte often tymes herde of: but there in is a more ſecrete meanyng, and approchinge nere vnto reaſon. As in myne opinion, by the tranſlacion of mans ſoule, wherof we haue ſpo-

ken,

ken, from a man to a beaſt, and finally eftſones vnto a man agayne: It may be well vnderſtand in this wiſe. That men being in the ſtate of innocencie haue than the figure of man, the ſoule hauing the wholl preeminence ouer the bodie. But after if it happen, that the appetites and deſyres of the bodie ſo much do increaſe, that thei haue the whole poſſeſſion of the bodie, and that the affections of the ſoule, that is to ſai, vertues be ſuppreſſed or put to ſcilence, than the life becometh beaſtly: than loke in what beaſtes the ſaide appetites be moſte vehemente: he, in whom is the ſemblable appetite, may be ſaid, hath his ſoule in that beaſt incloſed.

As he that is lecherous and wanton, in ſuche a horſe as thou ſpakeſt of while ere. A cruell man or tyranne in to a tigre or lion, a glutton or dronkarde in to a wolfe or a ſwyne, and ſo furthe of other. And if one man happen to be

poſ-

ſeſſed of many vices, than is his tranſ-
formacion more diuers, and as I
mought ſaie more monſtruous. Alſo
beyng in that beaſtly aſſate, and the
ſoule with hir affectes beyng hid and
not ſhewing hir puiſſance, what any o-
ther thynge is more in them than igno-
rance? Whiche being a thyng beaſtly,
is as propre to them as beaſtly appe-
tite. But if god ſo willyng after longe
trauailing in yll affections, the ſoule re-
couereth hir might, and banquiſht igno
rance, makyng the bodie to knowe his
miſerie, than the beaſtes hyde by littell
and littell falleth awaie as knowlage
increaſeth, and finally man reſumeth
his verie figure and proporcion, liuing
after the rule of the ſoule, and ſo conti-
nueth perpetually. Howe ſaieſt thou
Ariſtippus to this expoſicion? ARI.
It ſemeth to me to ſtande with good
reaſon: for euer me thought, that Py-
thagoras ſentence, whiche was a man
of

of incomparable wisedome, had such a meanyng. PLA. Also it appereth by the saide sentence, that ignorance maketh a man beastly, and that knowlage putteth awaie beastlines, and restoreth a man to his dignitee. ARI. Verely. PLA. And it seemeth by that, whiche is rehersed, that ignorance, that we call beastly, is in that, that beastes doe not know, what thei them selfes be, nor betwene them and men what is the diuersitee. Also that men knowe the diuersitee betwene them and brute beastes, it hapneth of the soule, hauyng preeminence ouer the bodie, that is to saie whyle the soule doeth holde the senses of the bodie vnder due rule and obedience ARI. I wote not howe to answere the. For I haue affirmed so muche before, that I can not replie nowe with myne honestie. PLA. For thy keppynge of touhe Aristippus I can well praise the. But howe saiest thou? Haue we not

of

of ignorance spoken for this time sufficiently? ARI. Yes I suppose, and we haue nowe passed two miles in our iournaie: therfore retourne where thou leftest to speake of knowlage. For thou hast laide a good grounde on thy table to set out thine Image. PLA. I see thou forgettest nothynge that I haue spoken. Therfore let vs assaie to expresse that Image, that is to saie, to declare what is that knowlage, wherin lieth very wisedome, which peraduenture kynge Dionyse hoped to fynde in me, whan he first desired to see me.

The seconde dialogue.

PLATO.

THou doest remembre Aristippus, that we be agreed, that knowlage is contrarie to ignorance? And I suppose also thei be so contrarie, that thei maie

neuer

neuer accorde, or in any parte be mingled together: but alwaie where the one is, the other lacketh. ARI. Ye surely it muste nedes folowe. PLAT. Than whan Ignorance is ones put awaie clerely, knowlage onely remaineth. ARI. Ye so I trowe: or els I wot not what it is, that abideth, excepte I wolde call it nothyng. And yet now I am aduised, that the same, *nothyng*, is Ignorance. For of nothyng can be no knowlage. PLA. Thou speakest truely, and as it besemeth the scholer of Socrates. Nowe thou knowest, that Ignorance is of beastes, which therfore be named brute: and that knowlage is onely perteinyng to man. And that the Ignorance, wherby beastes be moste vnlike vnto man, is ignorance of them selfes, in as muche as thei know not, that they be beastes. Than it foloweth, that the knowlage, whiche maketh the greattest diuersitee betweene man and beast,

beaſt, and wherby man hath preemi-
nence in dignitee ouer beaſtes, is the
knowlage of hym ſelfe: wherby alſo he
knoweth other. ARIS. Pe, ſuppoſeſt
thou ſo? Doeth a mau by knowyng
hym ſelfe, know other alſo? PLAT.
No doubt therof, and that ſhalt thou ſe
proued in the order of our communica-
cion, by the ſame reaſon that ſhall
make him to knowe him ſelfe. But yet
leſte thou be deceiued, I wil by the way
demaunde one queſtion of thee. Thou
ſaidſt while ere Ariſtippus, that a beaſt
hath not the knowlage of him ſelfe and
of other in thediuerſitee of their kindes,
I praie thee, what vnderſtodeſt thou
thereby? Any other than thou didſt de-
clare by the example of the bee and the
ſpainell? ARI. None other: Why, thin-
keſt thou Plato, that I ſaide not well?
PLA. Thou cameſt (as I ſaid) nigh
to the point, but yet thou hitteſt it not.
For peraduenture thy ſuppoſell maie

be in some parte false, although thou haste not espied it. Dost thou not beholde, that beastes, whiche be sauage, as thei be diuers in kynde, so doe they conuaite to be together, and will seuer them selfes from other? And in the acte of generacion will accompanie with none other beast, but suche as is of his owne proper kinde, not withstandyng that there be diuers of them one so lyke an other: that vneth a man can discerne the diuersitee. As wolfes and mastifes: foxes and curres, hares and conies, and many other beastes, whiche were tediouse to be rehersed. And as touching the bee, that we spake of, be there not diuers flies lyke vnto him? And for all that he wyll companie with none of them, nor yet suffer them (if he be of power to resiste) entre in to his hiue, but at the first sight will withstande him. Moreouer all the saide beastes, whan they perceiue a man comyng towarde them,

them, thei wil not abide, but flee sooner from hym than from any beast. Further among an infinite nombre of people, a dogge will know his maister, although there were a thousande men, in personage, facion, and colour of garmentes very like vnto him. And if thou woldest saie, that the dogge doeth discerne that by sent of smelling, yet wold I demaunde of the againe, howe it happeth, that a dogge taken vp at Olinthum, and brought vnto Athenes, whiche be distant. xl. myles one place from the other, and is a very diffuse wai to kepe, and littell trauailed, yet after that the dogge hath ben reteined at Athenes by the space of sixe monethes, whan he hath ben at libertee, he hath returned againe home to his maisters house, howe wouldest thou aunswere me Aristippus? ARIS. Howe els? But euen as thou thy selfe didst suppose that I wolde saie, that the dogge

founde the waie by sente specially, adding to peradventure some parte of his sight. PLA. But perchance or he come to Olinthum his maister hath forsaken the house that he dwelled in, whan he was with hym, and is remoued in to an other house: doest thou not thinke, that the dogge wyll goe to the house, where he left his maister, and not to the house where he dwelleth? ARI. Yes in good faith. PLA. And yet percase he shall fynde his maisters steppes in the strete towarde his new house. And not withstanding as soone as he espieth the other house, he passeth forthe, and goeth streight to it. But whan he cometh in, and findeth not his maister there, yet he laieth hym downe as he were at home, trustyng that his maister wyll shortely come in: doeth he this by sighte or by smellyng? ARI. Thou makest me doubt Plato, whether he doeth it by any of them. PLA. What if it happen,

that

that his maiſter, not knowyng hym to be there, ſtandyng nigh to the window talketh loude with his neighbour, ſo that the dogge heareth hym: thinkeſt thou not, that he will riſe ſodainly and with great haſt come ioifully vntil his maiſter? ARI. Yes, I haue ſene that in experience. PLA. Doth he that by ſauour or by ſyght? ARI. By neither of them, but onely by heryng. PLA. And whan he cometh to him, he ſtreight leapeth vppon hym without any ſmelyng. ARI. I am yet in doubte what I maie ſaie. PLA. Onely becauſe thou wilt not graunt contrarie to thine aſſertion, that a beaſt hath knowlage of hym ſelfe and other in the diuerſitee of theyr kyndes. But what wilt thou ſaie, if it ſhall appere vnto thee, that beaſtes haue yet an other knowlage among them ſelfes than by their ſenſes? haſt not thou ſene, whan men haue prepared them ſelfes to goe on huntyng,

and to that intent haue brought forthe their leshes, coiers, and lyams, or els their hates and purse nettes, that the houndes espiyng these thinges, haue retoyced and lepte about the house, as if thei knew, that thei shuld go on huntyng? Likewise whan thei here the hunter blowe his horne, thei do all rise, and with one voice doe make a great noise, as if they consented to goe to that solace. And yf thei herde one blowe in a shalme, or a trumpette, thei wolde not do so.

¶ The coursar, whiche is vsed to battaile, as soone as he hereth the trũpettes blowen, he snorteth and braieth, and taketh to him his courage, he tredeth high and praunceth, and with suche bragges declareth him selfe redie to set forthe in bataile, supposest thou, that these beastes haue this knowlage only by the senses, wherof we haue spoken? ARIS. No, it semeth to me nowe, that

that thei haue an other knowlage than onely by senses, but what it is, or wherof it procedeth, I can not discusse, except I shulde name it naturall influence, diuersely disposed more or lasse, after the grosseneſſe or capacitee of the bodie, whereunto it floweth. PLA. By the faithe of my bodie, and that definition is not to be dispreised, if thou adde therbnto the senses. But by this that thou and I haue now spoken, it semeth, that beastes haue knowlage of them selfes and other in the diuersitee of their kyndes contrarie to thy firſte diuision. And if it be so, than be thei equall to men, and without cause we do cal them ignorant or brute. ARIS. I wote not what to saie to thee. PLA. Abide Aristippus, dispaire not, thou hast spoken more wiseliar than thou art ware of. ARI. Trowest thou so Plato. PLA. Ye, and that shalt thou perceiue, if thou wylte here me. ARI. Goe to than

I praise thee. PLA. Let it not be tedi-
ouse vnto the to haue some thynges re-
peted, which thou hast spoken.

¶ Firste if thou remembre thy selfe,
thou woldest not denie, but that wise-
dome was knowlage. Afterwarde thou
grauntedst also, that Ignorance was
none other thynge but lacke of know-
lage, whiche concluded, that ignorance
could be no wisedome. And than didst
thou reason, that the diuersitee betwene
man and beast was onely ignorance.
And that ignorance didst thou suppose
to be the lacke of knowlage of them
selfes, and other in the diuersitee of
theyr kyndes. This was very well ga
thered of the, in myne opinion. And
the reason that folowed by the exemple
that thou dydst put of thy horse, the bee,
and the spaniell, was not vnfitte to the
purpose, if thou wouldest haue abiden
well by it. But by our mery digres-
sion in to Pythagoras regeneracions,

thou

thou were brought from that argument, sooner than thou shuldest haue ben: which hapned vnto the, as it doeth euer to them, whiche like vnto the, do folowe the concupiscence and pleasaunt affectes of the bodie. For like as they be vnstable, so the folowers and louers of them be euer inconstant: as well in their opinions as in their actes. But if thou beyng sometime the herer of Socrates as well as I was, hadst folowed directely his doctrine, according as he spake it, and also practised it by his example of liuing, and hadst not as a truant piked out of his argumentes such matter as thou supposidst mought only mainteigne thy sensuall appetite, thou shuldest haue perceiued, what thou thy selfe hadst ment, whiche thou doest not now, it varieth so muche from thy profession. And peraduenture the knowlage that we nowe seke for, shuld neuer haue comen betweene vs two in

 questi-

queſtion. But it ſhulde haue ſuffiſed to haue tolde to the, what I ſaide to kyng Dionyſe, and howe he delte with me. And thou ſhuldeſt ſoone haue iuged, if he had accoꝛding to my merites intreated me. But nowe Ariſtippus, to thintent thou maiſt take ſome comfoꝛte of the ſedes of Socrates doctrynie, whiche remaine in the, but they wyll not ſpꝛinge, in ſuche wiſe as thou maiſt ſee them, excepte I do water them with my declaracion.

Firſt remembꝛe, that of all that whiche beareth the name of a thynge, there be two kyndes, one hath no bodie, and is euer ſtedfaſt and parmanent: the other hath a bodie, but it is euer moueable & vncertein. The firſt, becauſe it maie be vnderſtande only, it is called intelligible. The ſecond, becauſe it maie be felt by ſenſis, it is called Senſible. The waie to knowe the firſte is called reaſon, and the knowlage therof is named vnder-

ſtan-

standing. The waie to know the. ii. is called sense or feling, the knowlage ther of is named perceiuing. More ouer, of that whiche is called intelligible, there is the first & the seconde. In the first is that portion of diuinitee, whiche is in man, wherby he is made to the image & similitude of god. In the other be numbres and figure. Of this, beastes haue no parte neither of the firste nor yet of the seconde: Of the first I suppose thou wilt graunt me, and as for the seconde experience wil proue it: for I dare saie, thou neuer hardest of beastes, that cond skill of nombryng. ARI. I wote nere, I neuer called any yet to a reckenyng. PLA. And though an ape or other like beast, seme in takyng of thinges, to obserue an order, as it were in nombring, yet if it be wel considred, it shal appere, that it is by an imagination ingendred of custome, and not by nombryng. I haue seene a man, whiche was

borne

borne blinde, and vsed to be ladde to three or foure houses in the citee, which hath ben a great distance a sonder, at the laste by custome hath knowen so well where they stode, that without any man or dogge leadyng, or any man tellyng hym, he hath gone directely vnto them. Wherat firste I mervailed with many other, and whan I communed with hym, I haue perceiued, that he never observed nombre, but that onlye custome had set the distance of the places in his imagination. Like maie be spoken of figures. For that wherby beastes do discerne one thyng from an other, is not understandyng, that is to saie, though thei discerne in quantitee the more from the lasse, yet thei understand it not, as rounde, quadraunt, or triangle, or in other like figure: but the simularre or ymage, wherby thei perceiue the said diuersitee, is onely by custome, formed and imprinted in the

principall sense, which is the herte. And whan the thyng selfe is remoued out of sight, that impression that remaineth is called imagination, who committeth it forthwith vnto memorie, whiche vndoubtedly is not only in men but also in beastes, for they discerne the tyme present, and that which is passed, but the tyme to come thei know not, and Memorie is onely of the tyme passed. And therfore the beastes, that thou spakest of, do perceiue the diuersitee of thinges by Imagination and Memory, conteiuyng and reteinyng in the herte, which is the principal sense or fontaine of senses, the image of the thynge that is sensible. And therby the dogge perceiueth his maister, and fetcheth his gloue, whiche he hath ben before taught for to do, and goeth to the places where he hath sene his maister bene a litell before. But that he knoweth not whether his maister be a man or a horse, Plato or

De-

Demosthenes, a philosopher, or an oratour, it is euident enough. For although my dogge had abiden ten yeres continually with me, and had herde me euery daie speake of Demosthenes, and name hym an oratour, and herde the call me euery daie Plato, and name me a philosopher: yet if thou woldest deliuer vnto him any thinge, and bid him carie it to the oratour, he wolde streight bringe it vnto me, and not to Demosthenes. Also if I wold cast a lose vnto my spaniel, and bid him carie it to my horse, I suppose he wold forthwith eate it him selfe, and lie down whan he had done, without seking for my horse, though he stode by him, is it not so? AR. Be in good faith me thinketh thou saist truly. PLA. And likewise maie be reasoned of all other beastes, be thei neuer so wily, if their actes be depely considered. AR. It appereth so. PL. Than thy saiyng is not reproued, that a beast lacked

lacked knowlage of hym selfe and of other. ARI. So, as it semeth. PLA. And that lacke of knowlage is ignorance. ARI. Ye truely, and so saide I also. PLA. And that ignorance made the diuersitee betwene man and beast. ARI. Ye and the same to. PLA. Than thou wylt conclude, that man hath knowlage? ARI. Ye that I must nedes, thou knowest well enough. PLA. And what callest thou that knowlage? supposest thou it is, where a man knoweth hym selfe and other? ARI. Ye so I saied, and thou haste also affirmed it. PLA. So I dyd in deede: but yet good Aristippus, suffer me to demaunde of thee a fewe questions, we shall the sooner fynde out the knowlage that we seke for. Is it in figure and nombre that knowlage resteth? ARI. ye so it appereth. PLA. Mate, if thou remembre the. Verdie thou saidst thy selfe, that thy horse knew not, that thou awer mā,

or

or that he was a horse. ARI. So said I in dede. PLA. Thou considerst also, that it was agreed by vs bothe, that the figure made not the man, but it was the soule with the bodie that caused the man to be so named: and that without the soule, not withstandyng the figure of man, yet were he no man but a brute beaste. ARI. It muste nedes be so, I can not denie it. PLA. Than is there somewhat more, that maketh the saide knowlage besides the figure, which is conteined in the seconde parte of that, whiche we called Intelligible? ARIS. So me thinketh. But what it is I can not remembre. PL. It is no meruaile, thy wittes be so inuolued in carnall affections, that this clene and pure doctrine can not entre in to them without gret difficultee, and whan they be ones inthei, can not longe abide, thy memorie is so occupied about wanton and beastly fantasy. But yet will I ones a-

gaine

gaine reherce vnto the that, whiche thou hast so shortly forgotten. Did not I saie, that in the firste parte of that, whiche is named *Intelligible*, is that portion of diuinitee in man, wherby he is made to the image and similitude of god? ARI. Yes I remembre well that. PLA. And is that forme printed in any other thyng than in mans soule, whiche is immutable, and of one proportion and figure? All though it lyeth bounden in the bodie, as it were in a prison, consideryng thinges diuersely: as the substance and qualitees of the bodie suffreth him to take light: beyng deceiued by the iudgement of the senses or wittes, estemyng thynges as they be sensible and visible: where that whiche the soule by hym selfe doeth consider, is intelligible and also inuisible.
ARI. I doubte me what I shall saie. But supposest thou Plato, that the image and similitude of god is not in

the bodie of man as well as in the soule: PLA. Hast thou so soone forgotten that, which I haue so often rehersed: That if the bodie of man were without a soule, he were than but in the nombre of brute beastes, whiche haue senses as well as he, and some more sharpe & quicker. And no man that wyll affirme that god is, will presume (as I trowe) to saie expressely, that the image of god is in Satyres, and other beastes and fisshes, whiche haue fourme and shappe lyke vnto man. And to speake to the merily without reproche vnto gods maiestee: If that, whiche is in euery mans bodie, were the image of god, certes than the image of god were not onely diuers, but also horrible, monstruous, and in some parte ridiculouse: that is to saie, to be laughed at. For euery man hath not in visage and personage one proporcion or figure. Some haue a playne and

equall

equall vilage, some loke as they laughed, other as thei wepte, diuers as thei were euer angrie, many haue in the quantitee of their bodies or membres excesse or lacke. Wherfore to thynke, that all these be lyke vnto god (whiche as he is the creatour of them all, and maie make and dooe what he listeth, so it agreeth with all reason, that he incomparably excelleth them all in euery perfection, and consequently in beautie) it were of all other the greatest madnesse. ARI. Thou answerest me reasonably. But now I praie the declare to me as plainely, howe the image of god is in the soule, as thou supposest. PLA. Thou wilt not denie, that god is without any bodie inuisible and immortall, whose forme can not be deprehended with the eies of mortal men, nor described by any sensible knowlage? ARI. No truely. PLA. And the same I trowe thou wilte confesse of the

soule? ARI. Ye verily. PLA. Also god is in power in all and euery parte of the worlde: And by his prouidence all thynge is gouerned and moued. And he him selfe is of none other moued nor gouerned, but is the first incomprehensible mouer. ARI. I can by no reason denie it, excepte I wolde denie, that god is, and that I mate not, sens that the order of all thyng that is visible declareth, that there must nedes be one principall cause and beginnyng, whiche we call god. And also that order can not be without prouidence and one perpetuall gouernaunce. PLA. Yet thou saiest well, and as it besemeth Socrates scholer. But now Aristippus, for as muche as god is the firste and principall cause, And as he is one in beginning, so is he euer one in gouernance: And therfore hauyng in him all sufficiency and power, wilt thou not graunt me, that he is of an absolute and

full

full perfection? ARI. Yes that muſt nedes. PLA. And is not perfection in that it is perfecte, good alſo? ARI. No man wyll denie it. PLA. Ye peraduenture the ſame perfection is goodneſſe, ſens goodneſſe is alwaie complete, profitable, and without any lacke. And goodneſſe and euill, the one is contrarie and euer repugnant vnto the other: Howe ſaieſt thou? is it not ſo? ARI. Ye that is true. PLA. Than is there euer variance betwene them? ARI. So it appereth. PLA. But in god can neuer be variance, whiche of his nature is euer one, and maie neuer ſuffer diuiſion. ARI. I graunt thee. PLA. Than in god nor about god can be none euill: therfore all euill is farre from god. But yet me ſemeth we haue ſpoken ſomewhat laſſe of god than we ſhuld dooe. ARI. what meaneſt thou therby? PLA. For ſens we both haue agreed, that he is the firſte beginnyng

and cause: we shulde haue also concluded, that all goodnesse proceded of him, and that he was the fountayne and principall goodnesse. ARI. I admitte all to be true that thou saiest. PLA. Than thou graunteſt, that euill is contrarie to god. ARI. Ye verily. PLA. And all thing that is yll, is contrarie to that thing, whiche is good? ARI. Ye surely. PLA. Those thinges that be contrarie one to an other, be thei like in that, wherin thei be contrarie? ARI. No truely. PLA. Than it semeth, that thei be vnlike? ARI. So is appereth. PLA. That, wherin thinges be like or vnlike one to an nother, do we not cal it an image or similitude? ARI. Yes vndoubtedly. PLA. Hitherto we haue well agreed. Nowe let see Aristippus, Sens thou haste confessed, that the soule is inuisible and immortall, how saiest thou? shall it suffice, that therin onely he be like vnto god,

and

and in all other thynge vnlike or contrarie? ARI. No: for than shulde he be in parte like, and in parte vnlyke: And than were it not well spoken, to saie, that man was made to the image and similitude of god, without ioigning therto distinctly and particularly in what thynge he was made to the said image and similitude: As if one wolde saie, that in thy sonne, were thy propre image and similitude. If thou thy selfe didst perceiue, that he were like to the in fauour, proporcion of bodie, and condicions, thou woldest holde the pleased and saie nothyng. But if thou beheldest, that in his personage he were like the, but in some parte of the visage, as in the nose, the eies, or the mouthe he were vnlike the, Also in liberalitee he folowed the, but in lecherie he did degenerate from the: shuldest thou not than be constrained to demaunde of hym that spake, wherein

thy sonne is like to the, or in what parte of hym thyne image shulde appere to be moste? PLA. Nowe on my faithe Aristippus, thou speakest veray well and wisely. Lo, see how by our longe communyng thou art drawen from thy wanton affections and fantasies, wherby the sparkes of wisedome, that thou gatest of Socrates lessons, like as fire hyd vnder askes and deade coles, whan thei be remoued is founde sindryng in littell imbres: so thine affections being withdrawen, wisedome dothe begyn to glister and shew, which if it woulde abide kendlyng, and not like vnto imbres remoue and flee awaie with euery puffe of winde, I doubte not, but for the sharpenes of thy wit, of all Socrates scholers thou shuldist be at the last one of the most wisest and excellent. But I wyll speke therof no more, lest thou shuldest suppose I did to the, that I wold not do to kynge

Dionyse,

Dionyse, I mene flatter thee. ARI.
No no, I perceiue wherabout thou goeſt: thou wouldeſt with perſuaſion, wherin I know thou art meruailous, withdraw me, if thou moughtiſt, from my profeſſed opinion, but that is now no parte of our matter. PLA. Yet I ſuppoſe thou art deceiued, for thou ſhalt finde it otherwiſe, or we be at an ende of our communication: but where lefte we? Thou didſt affirme (as I remembre) that for as much as man was made to the image and ſimilitude of god, he ought to be lyke vnto god not in parte, but in all vniuerſally. ARI. In all ſuche likenes, as that whiche is creatid, maie be moſte like vnto his creatour, without comparison of equalitee. For god, that is alwaie one, maie ſuffre no pere, or like in equalitee of ſubſtance. PLA. That is verily well ſaid Ariſtippus, Although that was euer ment in our reaſonyng: for I neuer

ſuppoſid, that thou hadſt ſo littell lerning, to thinke, that god made men equall vnto hym: or ſo ignorant, that thou knewest not, what an image or ſimilitude is, in reſpecte of that, whervnto it is wrought. By that whiche we before haue affirmed, that god is the firſte cauſe and principall goodnes, it argueth that all thinge, whiche is not the ſelfe god, is inferiour vnto hym. Wherfore the image or ſimilitude of god, all though it be an imitacion or folowyng in likenes of that, whervnto it is made and reſembled, yet is it inferiour to god: who by the vertue of his vnitee hath euer a preeminence, and ſouereintee. Therfore we will ſticke no more therupon, but now I will aſſaie to declare, howe we maie vnderſtande, that the ſimilitude of god is imprinted in man: wherin the knowlage, that we began to treate of, perchance ſhall appere vnto vs. Wher-

fore

for Aristippus, I praie the, as thou hast done hitherto, here me patiently: and whan I shall demaunde of the any question, answere me simply without cauillacion. ARI. Contented. But be shorte than I praie the, for me thinketh it longe er we come to an ende of our matter. PLA. Pe so I suppose. For as I said, the littel sparkes of wisdom, that appered in thee, will neuer be brought to be a good fire, thei be so mingled with askes of affection: wherby thei be made so inconstant, that thei wyll not abide the ende of my reason: wherby perchaunce thei mought be caused to kendell and ware more. But sens thou hast promised to here me patiently, I wyll goe forthe with this matter: and doubte not, but that I will make an ende, er we come to the citee. ARIS. Go to than. For I am nowe prepared to here the.

The thirde dialogue.

PLATO.

SEns we haue treated some what of god, and of mans soule, but not sufficiently, for that wolde require a muche lengar tyme, and also that bothe thou and I had our myndes more cleane pourged with prayer and pure sacrifice. Now let vs see, as much as we maie be suffred, what it is, wherin thei moste doo resemble.

God. ☞ First all that is in God, is perpetuall and immutable, and by none occasion, or for any cause maie be appaired, minisshed, or corrupted. That whiche is in the soule, parte is perpetuall and immutable, parte is not perpetuall, and is also mutable. For that the soule is immortall and inuisible, that is perpetuall and maie neuer bee chaunged. But vnderstandyng, whi-

che

the I dyd put for the knowlage of that, whiche was intelligible, and named it a porcion of diuinitee, is not perpetuall in the soule, as it is in God, nor all waies immutable: but duryng the time that it is conserued by contemplacion of the diuine maiestee, it is perfecte, and maketh mans soule like vnto God And whan it is ioygned vnto corporall affectes, it is made than vnperfecte, and the fourme of the soule is in a parte decaied from the right similitude of God. But if the soule being dedicate to vices, be ones fallen from the possession of reason, than vnderstandyng is vanisshed awaie, and the soule remaineth with the bodie transfourmed, as we spake of before. And than that immortalitee, whiche beyng ioygned to vnderstandyng, made the soule like vnto God, beyng nowe separate from it, shall be to the soule confusion and tourment.

¶ The maiestee of God, in beholdyng wherof the said vnderstandyng or knowlage is conserued and kepte in perfection, is all his goodnes, whereof I haue spoken, and his prouidence, whiche procedeth of the same goodnesse. In beholdyng the goodnesse of God, man dothe perceiue, that therof procedeth vertue. In considerynge his prouidence, he findeth that nothyng is made without cause, or (as I mought saie) at venture: but that all thynges be made for a pourpose, profitable, and also necessarie, and so to the respecte therof all thynges be good.

¶ Nowe I wyll demaunde of thee Aristippus one question. Doest thou not remember, that thou thy selfe saidst late, that it were not well spoken, to saie, that man was made to the image and similitude of God: if he had in him no mo thynges lyke vnto god, but only that he were inuisible and immortall,

mortall and that diddst thou ratifie with a good and familiar example. ARI. It is not so longe passed sens I spake it, but that I maie well remembre it PLA. And thou diddst not denie, but that the parte intelligible of man is a diuine substance, wherein is vnderstandyng? ARI. No not yet wyll I. PLA. Than it semeth, that in vnderstandyng man is like vnto god. And the same vnderstandyng is knowlage: but is man like to god in any other knowlage trowest thou, than in contemplacion of the diuine maiestee? ARI. I praie the reherse that more plainely vnto me. PLA. By my trouthe thou arte verie dull in perceiuyng. I saie, in beholding perfectely the prouidence and goodnes of god: dyd I not declare to thee but euen nowe, that therin was gods maiestee? ARI. Well nowe I perceiue thee. It semeth verily Plato, that therin is the knowlage, wherin

as thou haste affirmed, is a porcion of diuinitee. PLA. Why that same knowlage also he knoweth, that vertue is good, because it procedeth of goodnes. ARI. Ye. PLA. Doth he not also knowe, that euill is contrarie to good. ARI. Why not PLA. And he knoweth, that vice is contrari to vertue. ARI. Ye that is trwe. PLA. Than knoweth he, that vice is yll, because it is contrarie to that whiche is good? ARI. I agree also therto. PLA. By the same reason doth he knowe, that he whiche is vicious, that is to saie, he whiche is possessed with vice, is yll: and he that is vertuous, is good. ARI. Ye trulie. PLA. Than he that is vicious is contrarie and vnlyke vnto hym that is vertuous. ARI. It muste nedes be so. PLA. In any other thyng but that he is yll. ARI. In none other thynge. PLA. And he that is vertuous, is he likevnto God, whych is all goodnes, for

any

any other thyng but for that he is good? ARI. No I suppose. PLA. I han see howe he that is vertuous, is like vnto God. And that he whiche is possessed with vice, is contrarie and vnlike vnto hym. ARI. I must nedes agree to thy reason. PLA. Nowe in consideryng the prouidence of God, whiche also belongeth to vnderstandyng, Order in euery thinge is perceiued to be, whiche order like a streight line issueth out of prouidence, and passeth directely through all thynges that be created. And therin be degrees, wherin those thynges beyng sette, one hath preeminence ouer a nother in goodnes. ARI. So it appereth. PLA. Dyd not we call that goodnesse while ere necessarie and profitable? ARI. Yes that I remembre. PLA. Vnto whom, supposest thou, be thynges profitable? ARI. Vnto whom els but to them whiche do vse them? PLA. And to them that do

Order.

use them moste, be thei moste profita-
ble? ARI. Ye so it foloweth. PLA.
But if thei fall from the degrees of the
saide line, wherin thei were ordeined
and sette, by the saide providence: and
change their order, than those thynges
do ceasse to be necessarie one to an o-
ther, because thei be out of their right
places, where god had ones sette them
for to be necessarie. ARI. In dede so
it semeth. PLA. And where order lac-
keth, there is disorder. ARI. Ye that
is trewe. PLA. Also either order is
good, and disorder yll, or els contrarie.
ARI. Ne but as thou saidest firste.
PLA. And that whiche is good, is al-
so profitable: and contrarie wise, that
which is yll, is also vnprofitable. ARI.
Ye verily. PLA. Than thou wilt grant
me, that order is good and profitable,
and disorder is yll and vnprofitable?
ARI. That muste I nedes doe. PLA.
Than what saiste thou, bee not all
thinges,

thynges, wherin is order or disorder, either good and profitable, or yll and vnprofitable in vsyng one an nother? ARIS. Yes doubteles. PLA. And to them that do vse them? ARIS. So it appereth. PLA. More or lasse as thei be muche or littell vsed? ARI. I can not denie it. PLA. I am veri glad Aristippus, to see howe seryously and truely thou kepest tacke with me, sens thou didst promise me, that thou woldest answere according as thou thoughtest, without leanyng to any particular opinion. And in that appereth in the a token of more wisdome: than is in all the residue of thy profession. But now remembre well what thou haste spoken: And shewe me, if thou thinkest that any other creature hath so muche vse of all thynges, that be created, as manne hathe, reuolue them well in thy mynde er thou speakest, consyderynge what commoditee one

thynge maie haue by vsyng an other.
And of howe many thynges one thynge
maie receiue any commoditee. Howe
sayst thou, hast thou nowe well aduised
the. ARI. Me semeth Plato, that one-
ly man hath the vse of all thinges that
be created, and maie receiue of euerie the
of them a commoditee. Other thinges
do vse sometime one an other, but not
so generally. PLA. Than it semeth
also, that all thinges were created for
hym specially. ARI. What meanest
thou therby? PLA. For man doeth vse
or maie vse, all thinge that is, but not
contrarie: for the horse, the ore, or the
sheepe, likewise other thinges liuing, or
growyng, can not vse man, nor receiue
of hym any thynge but for mans proper
commoditee. ARI. Me thinketh thou
saiest truely. PLA. Ergo we be agree-
ed, that man vseth thynges moste of all
other? ARI. Be surely. PLA. Than
be there to hym either beste and moste
profi-

profitable, or els warste and moste vnprofitable. ARI. Thou speakest meruailously. PLA. Why saist thou so, sens this is but commune reason, and (excepte I be deceiued) to every man easie? but that the saide thinges be to manbest and most profitable, it hapneth of order: that thei be warst and moste vnprofitable, it commeth of disorder.

ARI. So verily it semeth. PLA. More ouer, the preeminence that man hath, being in the highest degree of the line that we spake of, augmenteth also the qualitee, that is to say maketh the thing that he vseth better or wars. As by example. A fatte shepe, hauyng muche woolle on his backe, for as muche as a man maie be fedde with his carcaise, and clothed with his wooll, is better than a leane and poore shepe, whose wooll being torne all of with the brembles, the carkais wil onely fede dogges: whiche gnawyng on the bones and bo-

welles, will therwith be nourisshed. Lykewise herbes, in that thei be medicinable and holsome, in preseruyng or restoryng helthe vnto man, be muche better than for that thei sede cattall or beastes: so that for the benefite that euery creature bringeth vnto man, it is the better in his kinde and more profitable. But sens it semeth, that for man specially all thynges were created, and that vnto hym thei be either best and moste profitable, or els warst and most vnprofitable, I would nowe knowe, wherin thei be vnto man good and profitable, or yll and vnprofitable. ARI. What meanest thou? Didst not thou declare it euen nowe thy selfe, whan thou saidest, that it hapned by order and disorder? PLA. I can the thanke, thou art nowe of a good remembrance. But doest thou perceyue Aristippus, what I mente therby? ARI. Dydst thou not meane, that some

beastes

beastes were ordeined for man to eate, some to clothe him with, some to tyll his lande for corne, other to ryde on: likewise herbes and frutes, some serue for meate and nourishyng, other for medicine, stone and timber to builde with. And whiles thei be vsed in this wise, as thei be ordeined, there alwaie is order. But if thei be vsed for an other purpose, or one in the place of an other, there is disorder. P. L. Abide Aristippus, thou hast forgotten some thinge behinde the, that will make much of the matter: Verelie there be some beastes, foules, & fishes, which wil serue to none of the purposes, whiche thou hast rehersed: As serpentes, scorpions, and such other like: of birdes the Egle, the dunkite, the Osprais, & the cormorant, whiche do rauin and deuoure that, whiche is necessarie for mans liuyng. Also crowes & rookes maie be brought into the

same company: And of fishes, that which in latine is called Torpedo, or ener he cometh out of the water, mortifieth the handes of the fisher, whiles he is drawing vp of his net. An other fish called Remora, although he be very little in bodie, yet will he stay and restraine a great shippe being vnder saile, and lette hym that he shall not passe forthe in his voyage. And diuers other bothe fishes and byrdes there be of semblable malice: howe wilt thou bryngr them into the order, that thou hast spoken of. ARI. Marie as thou saist Plato I can not well tell what to saie therto. PLA. I beleue that well enough, for thou art so fulfilled in carnall affections, that thou kepst nothing in remembrance, but onely that, which is commodious and pleasant. But I will helpe thy forthe, as well as I can. All be it I knowe well enough, I shall not bryngr theis thynges in order sufficient

ficiently. The prouidence of God is so
inscrutable that it can not al be compre-
hended by mans imagination notwith-
standyng by my demaundyng, & thine
answeryng, I truste we shall bryng
therin matter competent enough to
helpe vs to that thynge that we go a-
bout, that is to saie, to fynde out knowe-
lage, wherin wisdom lieth hid.

¶ First Aristippus thou must agree,
that all creatures in the final cause of
their creation be good: That is to saie,
hauing respecte to that they be made
for? ARI. We, that haue I graunted
all redy. PLA. Therfore to that re-
specte they can not be yll? ARI. That
is trouth, PLA. But malice is con- Malice.
trarie to good, and also taketh his de-
nominacion of euill? ARI. That I
knowe well enough. PLA. Than
spake I not well, whan I saide, that di-
uers beastes, fyshes, and birdes were
of semblable malice, as they were, of

whom I had spoken? ARI. It semeth so. PLA. For as much as by their creacion thei be all good? ARI. Ye for the same cause. PLA. Of the said beastes, birdes and fishes, there be some partes, which by phisicions, and them that seke for the naturall proprieties of thynges, be founden remedies against diuers sicnesses. ARI. So it hath ben affirmed by Democritus, and his disciple Hippocrates. And I my selfe haue sene mervailes, whan such thinges haue ben practised. PLA. And for as much as goodnesse came of them, thou didst iudge all suche thinges to be good? ARI. Ye in good faithe. PLA. Thou didst therin iudge truly, and as it was. But whan thou knewest any man to be stungen with a serpente, or Scorpion, wherby the man perished, didst thou suppose than, that the Scorpion or serpent was yll, or good styll as he was whan he serued for a medicine, and preserued man

from

from the deathe? ARI. I am not so madde to suppose that to be good, wher by man is distroied PLA. I suppose thou arte not: But sens we haue affirmed all thinge to be good in his creation, hauyng respecte to the ende wherfore it was created. For as muche as the saide beastes, birdes, and fishes receiued in their creation the disposicions before touched, whiche thou supposest to be yll berause therby man maie perishe and die: Let vs consider the cause finall, wherfore those disposicions were put by God of nature into the said cretures, wherin I wyll as briefely as I can, declare to the myne opinion or sentence. Foresene alwaie, that thou remembre, that the prouidence of God is abone mans capacitee to comprehende holly: But I doubte not, some parte of it shall serue (as I said) to the sufficient declaracion of that thyng that we purpose.

The fourthe dialogue.

PLATO.

Shall we nede Aristippus to make any plainer declaracion what thing it is, for the whiche all other thinges lackyng the vse of reason were created? ARI. No, for it appereth to me sufficiently that it is man: as thou hast all redie declared. PLA. And we be agreed longe agone, that man is of bodie and soule? ARI. Be no faile therof. PLA. And to the bodie the senses or wittes be ioygned, as vnderstandyng is ioygned to the soule? ARI. Accordyng. PLA. Also the bodie is sensuall and mortall, the soule is intellectuall and immortall, ARI. So it semeth. PLA. The first is in commune with beastes, & therfore it is bestly, the other is a portion of diuinitee, & therfore it is diuine & godly. ARI.

That

That haste thou longe agone proued: wherfore I wyll not nowe replie therein again the. PLA. I am glad, that I haue the so reasonable. But dost thou also remembre, that I said, that the diuine portion, duryng the time that it is conserued by contemplacion of the diuine maiestee, is perfecte and like vnto God, and whan it is ioigned vnto corporall affectes, it is imperfecte and vanisheth awai? ARI. Be I remembre it well. PLA. Nowe here me out patiently, and we shall come shortly to an ende of this matter. Thou knowest well enough Aristippus, that the bodie, and consequently the senses or wittes, that doe perteine therunto, is the habitacion or vessell, whiche receiueth the soule. Also affectes or affections, all though while ere I named them corporall, yet in very dede thei be first in the soule, as intencions be in the worke man before he doeth worke: And whan the

the soule doeth exercise them, having his chiefe respecte to vnderstanding, whereof we haue so muche spoken: than be thei vertues. But if thei beyng mixt with the senses, be all ruled by them in having onely respect to the bodie: than be thei vices, and the soule by the excludyng of vnderstandyng, beyng made subiect vnto the bodie, thei may than be well called corporall: as that ought to be called the gooddes of the vanquisshour, which were the prisoners before he was taken: or the gooddes of the bondman, be called the lordes. Now so it is, that God, of whose maiestee we haue spoken, and be yet in speakyng, whan he hath put the soule, accompanied with affectes (as his perpetuall seruauntes and ministers) into the bodi, as into his proper habitation, he giueth to hir the senses, to be as his slaues or drudges. And committyng to hir for a chiefe counsailour vnderstandyng, he lea-

leaueth with hir also free wyll to be hir secretarie. Nowe if she moughte alwaie kepe hir habitacion and companie in that astate, as they were leste with hyr: than shulde men be as gods. And those thynges, whiche brought any anoyance to men, shulde alwaie be yll, and be made by nature in baine. And also God shulde seme to do yll in the ordeinyng of them. Or els that in thynges there were no prouidence. But sens of so many men as nowe we be, haue bene, and shall be in the worlde, the bodies in the principall humours, wherof they be compacte (whiche as thou knowest is bloud, red choler, fleme, and blacke choler, called Melancolie) be of diuers temperatures. Therfore be they in sondrie wise inclined in the operacion of their senses or wittes: As some to actes veneriall and bigbnes of courage, other, more to get possessions and ry-

richesse, diuers for euerie littell displeasure to be cruelly reuenged: Manie to emploie all theyr studie and labour in yll crafte and deceite: other do abhorre all trauaile as well of mynde as of bodie, desyryng onely (as the blocke, whiche Iupiter did sende downe into the water, to haue rule ouer the paddockes) to lie styll and do nothyng. As soone as any of the saide inclinacions be conceiued in the senses, the mynde begynneth to haue delectacion therin, and offreth it to vs, as it were good, pleasant and profitable: Than if our affectes, by whom we be meued to do any thynge, do consent to the said delectacion, and than immediately will is corrupted, so that she, as false & disloyall, writeth in the herte of man (whiche is the soules boke, wherin al thoughtes be written) that the saide inclinacion meaued and set forthe by the sayde affectes, is profitable and good. If the

soule

soule hastily without askyng counsaile of vnderstandyng, do approue the same persuasion, beleuing will without any other inuestigacion or serche: Than the being abandoned of vnderstandyng, loseth hir dignitee, and becometh ministre vnto the senses, which before were hir slaues, who vsurpyng the preeminence, and hauing the affectes and will wholly at their commaundment, doe possede the bodie as their proper mansion, leauing nothynge to the soule, but to vse onely hir powers after their sensuall appetites. And so Man bireste of that portion, wherin he was like vnto God, is become equall, or rather inferiour to brute beastes, for such causes as I before haue rehersed. Now Aristippus, whá Man is ones brought vnto this astate doest not thou suppose, that he forgetteh nowe, or knoweth not what he is? or to expresse more plainly to the, what I meane. Is he not igno-

cant, that he is transformed from a man to a beast: And supposeth stil, that he is like vnto God, and in the order that we spake of, superiour vnto all other creatures, and dominator ouer them all: A. R. I. Be that is true, he beleueth so verily. P. L. A. But yet it is not so. For whan vnderstandyng was excluded by the soule, & that she was subdued or maistred by the senses, than the similitude of God, whiche was in vnderstandyng, vanished from hym. And whan he lefte his owne place of preeminence, and did participate in carnall affectes with creatures, whiche were to him inferiours, he brake the line of order, and loste his superioritee: and consequently brought him selfe and other into disordre, whiche as we haue agreed, is euill, and contrarie vnto good, and by the same reason is ennemie vnto God, whiche is onely goodnesse. For no man will denie, but

that

that thynge, whiche is so contrarie vnto an other, that in no parte thei maie accorde, but be alwaie repugnant: thei be mutually ennemies one to an other. A R I. I suppose it be even as thou saiest. P L. Now cal to thy remembrance, that we were agreed, that all creatures were made for man, and that he had the moste vse of theim all. Also thei all were good in the order of their creation, and that to man thei were best and moste profitable, as longe as thei continued in the saide order: And beyng in disorder, thei were also to man warste, and moste vnprofitable. More ouer, all though some beastes, foules, and fishes seme to haue in them a malice, wherby man maie be hurte or anoied, yet hauyng rewette to the cause finall, wherfore thei were made, thei were, not withstanding necessarie vnto man specially. A R I. I thanke thee hertily Plato for

this repeticion, wherby thou haste well reuiued my remembrance, whiche was well nighe oppressed with the abundance of matter, wherwith thou hast, as I mought saie, infarcid this communicacion. PLA. I know well enough Aristippus, that in matter of great importance, to men that be sensuall, hauing their mindes ingrossed with carnall affections, there is required a plaine and sensible forme of reasonyng, broken nowe and than with often repeticions: whiche all though to frowarde herers it semeth to make the matter tediouse, yet if thei can abide it, thei shall therby reteine some sedes of knowlage: like as in a lande that was neuer well husbanded, corne will growe and springe in ere, whan men litle loked, for to haue gotten such frute by their yl husbandrie. But nowe set vp thyne eares Aristippus, and diligently here the misterie of the wonderfull goodnes and

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prouidence of god, whiche shall be declared in the saide cause finall: whiche I intend now to expresse and open vnto the without further delaie. APP. Go to nowe Plato, I haue all my whole mynde setled and prepared to here the, and I shal not willingly let one worde, that passeth from thy mouthe, escape me.

PLA. Thou hasse all redie graunted, that a cunnyng artificer foreseeth in his imagination the figure of the thynge that he worketh, and to what effecte it is wrought, which is properly called the cause finall. And whan it is made, he deliteth in the beholdyng it. And the more perfect and excellent that the worke is, the more he therin reioyceth, and prepareth some meane to preserue it from breaking or other destruction. But there is no artificer to be compared vnto God, either in foresight, or in care to preserue that which he him

selfe wrought. For there is any mans workemanship like to his in perfection. Wherfore he most excellently reioyceth in his creatures. And because he considereth, that Man is the moste wonderfull of all his workes, he reioyceth therin most and incomparably. Also because he made hym to his owne similitude, he loueth hym, according to the commune prouerbe: All thynge loueth that, whiche is moste like to hym selfe. And therfore he is moste circumspecte in the preseruacion therof. Wherfore considerynge that by will, perchance corrupted, as I late declared, Man mought decline from that perfection, wherin he was made, and by the parte sensible induced to rebell against his owne creatour, thynkyng that of his owne power he hath all other creatures vnder his subiection, and that all that he willeth, is good, not as vnderstandyng wold in-

Man.

structe

ſtruct him, but as his affections decei-
ued by his ſences, do falſely perſuade
hym. This eternall and incomprehen-
ſible goodnes, whiche we call GOD,
louyng man as his image incompara-
bly, hath prouided to ſitte in the waie,
wherby will ſhall paſſe, many ſondrie
obſtacles and lettes to cauſe hym ta-
tarie, that in his courſe he fall not
headlyng in the botomleſſe pit of Ig-
norance, while he is in the waie to re-
bell againſt his maker and moſte mer-
cifull lorde. Theſe neceſſarie lettes be
diſeaſes & ſickeneſſes, wherby bodily
ſtrength is abated, & therwith carnall
affectes oppreſſed or minuſhed. Aduerſi-
tee, veration and trouble, wherby ſtor-
dy courage pride and ambition, & other
like malanders of the minde, may bet-
red, or at the leſt waies reformed. And
beſides theſe, be other obſtacles, wher-
by man ſhall be warned of his arro-
gance, whō be to much preſumeth on his

proper power, knowlage, and industrie. And therfore he will freely vse all thynges at his pleasure, wherin his senses haue delectacion, and his appetite moueth hym. These thinges God, forseyng (as I saide before) most louingly and wisely prouidyng for his moste derest creature against the sayde peryll of forgetfulnesse, like as he made man of soule and bodie: so with thinges necessarie and profitable to the bodie he ordeined thinges necessarie and profitable vnto the soule, sowyng amonge the herbes, that be holsome or pleasant, other noysome and venemous. In the grene banke lieth the serpente hidde, redy with his tremblyng tunge to strike mortally them, whiche doo approche hym. The scorpion wounden in the grene grasse, lieth watchyng with his forked taile in a redines to styng them, whiche loke not downe to their feete. The bodie infected or wounded, findeth

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in peine and anguiſhe his owne proper ignorance, in that, that he ſo muche eſteemed delectacion and pleaſure, whiche in ſo ſhorte a momente vaniſhed awaie. Alſo ſens a littell herbe, whiche is inanimate, maie change pleaſure in to peine, and helthe into ſickenes, or a littell vile worme at one ſtroke maie bireue him of all delectacion and pleaſure, and fill hym with ſo muche anguiſhe and dolour, that the life, whiche he dſired euer to continue, becometh to hym tedious and lotheſome: he ſhall therby not onely remembre, that he is paſſible, and therfore no god, but alſo perceiue and conſider, of how littell importance or valour is than his ſtrength, auctoritee, or puiſſance, were he neuer ſo mightie a champion, or ſo puiſſant a kynge or Emperour. And with that remembrance the parte ſenſible being rebuked, vnderſtandyng eſteſoones reſorteth vnto the ſoule, and helpeth hir to

reforme all hir wholl householde, set-tyng eftesones euery thyng in his pro-pre place and office, as it was before free will was corrupted. And if than the soule be circumspecte, and dooe re-straigne will of hir libertee, compel-lyng hir to be subiecte and so obedient to reason, that without hir consente she shall dare to do nothyng, than the cras-tie persuasions of the sensis shall no-thing auaile, but thei them selfes, will thei or no, shall be constreigned to be still drudges vnto the soule, as thei wer ordeigned. But if man dooe forget to set will vnder the gouernance of rea-son, and with a circumspecte delibera-cion, to appoinct vnto hir limites and bondes, which she shal not be so hardie to passe or excede. After the bodie is es-caped from aduersitee, or is deliuered of vehement peine and anguishe, foorth with the senses do prepare them selues eftsones to rebell. And affectes, whi-

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the as wanton girles be flexible or re-
die to incline to euery motion, doe
prepare them with wanton counte-
naunce and pleasant promises to allure
effesones will to their appetite: wherby
the soule shalbe ageine in danger to pe-
rishe, onlesse she reteinyng still with
hir understandyng, in considerong hir
propre state and condicion, and revol-
uyng what she before had suffred, doe
put will in to the prison of Drede, un-
der the streicte custodie of Remem-
braunce and reason. And in this wise,
as I haue rehersed, not onely he that
suffreth, receiueth commoditee of this
wonderfull prouidence: but also other,
whiche doe beholde him that suffe-
reth, or hereth it sufficiently reported,
maie and ought therby examine the
state of his owne persone, and as mor-
tall and passible, and no god, but the
image of God by understandyng, en-
deuour hym selfe to kepe that in perfec-

tion,

tion, hauing in good awaite, that they let not affectes become to malaperte, but that the soule haue vnderstandyng alwai at hir elbowe, whiche shall bid reason correcte will, if she be conuersant with these affectes. And than shall man still remaine without any of the saide transformacions, that we before spake of: and vse euery thynge accordyng to the effecte that thei were firste ordeined for hym: which is the cause finall, wherof I haue spoken, and promised to declare vnto the, wherin shineth the wonderfull prouidence, whereby God is best knowen. Howe saist thou Aristippus? doest thou beare awaie and perceiue what I haue all this while spoken? ARI. Ye that I doo Plato, all though it be meruailous: But yet me semeth thou hast omitted somewhat, whiche shulde make of all that whiche thou spakest, a perfect conclusion. PLA. Trowest thou so? Ma-

rſe I praie thee, tell me what lacketh, as thou doeſt ſuppoſe, and I will amende that gladly, for I wolde be loth, that in that, whiche we goe aboute, ſhulde be founde imperfection. ARI. I remembre, thou haſt affirmed through all thy reaſonyng, that all thinges, in reſpecte of their creation, be good, and that all was created for man: More ouer, that ſome thynges, whiche doo ſeeme to be yll, in very dede be not ſo, but be all good in their order of their creation. And for proſe of that thou dydſt induce by example, that aduerſitee and ſickeneſſe did cure or mitigate affectes and vanitees of the mynde. Alſo that venemous herbes, ſerpentes, and wormes, whiche ſemed to haue in them nothyng but malice onely, by anoiyng of men, that were ſenſuall, folowyng their affectes, and forgetting their ſtate, with peine and anguiſhe, bireſte them their pleaſure, wherin they

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delited, and made them remembre, that thei were passible: and by that consideracion to reforme them selfes accordyng to their firste perfection, wherin thei were ordeigned. And so diddst thou conclude, that aduersitee, sickenes, venemous herbes and beastes were good to that respect. And therfore necessarily prouided of god to the vse of man. Nowe for as much as all men be not sensuall, nor ladde with carnall affectes or vanitees: but some men kepyng the senses in their propre office or ductie, also kepyng will (as I mought vse thy wordes) within the precincte prescribed to hir by vnderstandyng: neede not so sharpe a monicion, as thou hast spoken of, where aduersitee, sickenes, venemous matter, or beastes do as sone and greuously anoie or hurte those good men, as them that be vicious: howe darest thou affirme them to be good: or declare them to be a part of

proui-

prouidence, wherby the goodneſſe of god is expreſſed? Theſe thynges conſidered, me thinketh Plato, thy concluſion (as I ſaide) is yet inſufficient.

PLA. In dede Ariſtippus it ſemeth, that thou haſte diligently herde me: but I feare me, that for the olde controuerſies betwene vs, thou markeſt more what I ſaie, to take me with ſome lacke, than to beare awaie and obſerue any thynge that maie profite the to knowe, in as muche as my concluſion, whiche thou reprouest, is not ſo inſufficient as thou doeſt ſuppoſe. Thou knoweſt that Scammonia, giuen where nede is, and in a due and conuenient proporcion, heleth them, whiche be vexed with melancoly: but exceding his meaſure, or taken where that humour doeth not abounde, in the ſtede of helth bringeth mortall ſickeneſſe almoſte incurable. The ſame dothe Thapſia, Agaricus, and diuers other, whiche

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do pourge the bodie of superfluous humours. The frutes named *Milones* and *Cucombres* asswageth the inordinate heate, that procedeth of choler: yet in them, whiche either by nature or occasion haue their belies colde, thei procure intollerable tormentes or fretynges. *Mandragora*, and the iuise of Popie, called *Opium*, to them, whiche by some vnnaturall cause be lette from slepe, dooe profite muche, if thei be measurably taken: contrarie wise, if thei be taken by him that is much fleumatike, and of nature disposed to slepe very soundly, and also the medicine exceedeth his portion, it bringeth the patient into so depe a slepe, that he neuer awaketh. But all though these thinges, whiche I haue rehersed, if thei haue not ioigned vnto them Oportunitee and measure, dooe bringe either dammage or deathe to them, which receiue them: yet no man doth accompte them

them for yll: but beyng put in the nombre of medicines, wherby mans bodie is cured, thei be called good.

¶ Is there any thynge amonge men better, or reputed more profitable, than lawes? And yet was there neuer lawe made by any man so perfecte, but that diuerse haue therby sustayned detriment, ye some that willyngly neuer offended. Also some lawes by addyng to sondrie opinions, be so muddled or wrapped in doubtes, that thei, whiche ones were and ought to be open and plaine to the people, whiche lyueth vnder them, and be bounde to obeie them, maie not without longe debatyng and great charges, be declared sufficiently. And yet who is so much displeased with any lawe, but that he will affirme, that lawes be good, ye and all though it happen sometyme that thei be yll executed. lawes,

¶ Like wise the venemous herbes, bea-

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ſes, and fiſhes, to that ende & purpoſe, whiche I haue declared, wherunto thei be ordeined, be good, whiche thou doeſt not denie me. And than by the examples, that I haue reherſed, my concluſion in declaracion of prouidence, is good and ſufficient. For if thou thinkeſt, that I ſhuld haue proued thoſe thinges to haue ben ſo abſolutely good, that thei mought not bee to any reſpecte ill, than thou lackeſt that naturall wit, whiche all this while I ſuppoſed had ben in the. For I woulde haue thought, that thou hadſt knowen, that nothyng is in this worlde ſo good, but that it maie bringe dammage to ſome man. Finally, that vnder the region of the Moone is nothinge ſo good, that it is not mixte with ſome yll, but remainyng in their proper degrees of order, wherof I haue ſpoken, one is better than an other, and be neuer yll but by diſorder: & there alſo one is wars than

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an other, by the degrees, I do meane the causes, wherfore thei were ordeined. As by example, to declare it more plainely: doest thou remembre Aristippus, whan we were speakyng of order and disorder, that thou saidst, that some beastes were ordeined for man to eate, some to cladde him with, some to tyll his lande, other to ride on: likewise herbes, fruites, and trees, som to serue for nourishyng, diuers for medicine, and other to builde with? ARI. Be I do remembre that well. PLA. Now marke well Aristippus. The ore, whiche tilleth the lande, beareth befe, wherwith man is nourished, & his hide serueth to make shoes to saue mens fete from colde and other annoyance. The sheepe beareth woll to cladde with the bodie of man commodiously: and his fleihe is good to be eaten: and where he lacketh puissaunce to drawe the plough or the wayne, in stede therof he

goinge and lyinge on the lande, with his ordure and pisse, compasseth the grounde, and maketh it fertile and able to bere plentie of corne. Wherfore these two be set in one degree in the line of order. The horse and all other beastes, whiche be like to that kynde, will drawe or carie. And also their hydes will serue to that pourpose, that the ere hyde doeth. But their flesshe is not apte to be eaten of men. Wherfore they be a degree vnder the other: And so consequently all thynges, as they be profitable more or lasse vnto man, if he do vse them, so be they higher or lower in degree in the saide line of order.

And if an Ore or a sheepe haue muche flesshe on hym and sweete, he is named therfore a good ore or a good sheepe.

If a horse or a mule will beare a great waight, and goe farre iourneies, he is named a good horse or a good mule.

And although a man aduisedly, or vn-

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aduisedly doue eate more beefe or mutton than his stomacke will beare, and therwith is sicke, the ore or the sheepe ought not therfore to be called yll. Nor if a man take awaie thy money or garmentes, and late it on thine owne horse or mule, and carie it awaie with hym: this letteth not, but that thy horse or mule shall be called stil good. But if thou wilte ride by poste on thyne ore, or thy sheepe, or coste thy horse or thy mule to banket with thy frendes: to those pourposes thou canst not call any of them good. For thei be out of their proper degrees or places in the line of order: and therfore thei be nowe yll. Semblably if in to thy potage, wherwith thou intendest to be nourished, thou doest cause to be put suche herbes as doue serue for violent pourgacions: or into thy salade chippes of oke, or of mapull, or buildest thy house with stalkes of fenell or ma-

lowes, or coueresst it with the leaues of letis or beetis: these herbes or trees so vsed, doe ceasse to be good, and maie to these pourposes be now called yll. So there is nothyng that is perfectly good, but god onely, and all other thinges the nerre thei approche towarde his similitude, the more dooe thei drawe to that perfection, and the higher be thei in the line of order, wherof I spake at the beginnyng.

¶ This that I haue nowe saide Aristippus, if thou doest well reuolue in thy mynde and consider, thou shalt not finde, that lacke in my conclusion, that thou haste obiected. But yet to satisfie the throughly, that in no parte thou shalte thinke my reason vaine or vnprofitable, wilt thou see, that I shall sufficiently proue, that sickenes, aduersitee, matter or bestes venemous, beyng in their degrees in the line of order, be neuer yll: but to that ende and purpose

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that thei were made for, thei be alwaie good? ARI. I thinke, to proue that, it shalbe impossible. PLA. Perchance naie. But forget not, that I protested, that the whole prouidence and iudgementes of god be to man, while he is mortal inscrutable, and ferre aboue his imaginacion or knowlage: yet of his infinite goodnes he holdeth him contented, that with due reuerence we shall measurably serche for them, only to the intent therby the more to knowe hym, honoure hym, and loue hym: and after that maner doo I nowe endeuour me, with the helpe of his spirite, to proue, that his prouidence is excellēt and most to be wondred at, in that thyng wherin thou and many other do suppose, that prouidence lacketh. ARIS. If thou canste brynge that well to passe, I will than saie, that the fame and renoume of thy wisedome, that is spronge through out Grece, is well emploied.

And I will affirme also, that kynge Dionyse, whan he gaue the to Dolidis, was more liberall than wise. For he had bene better to haue giuen to hym fire the beste cities in Sicile, than to haue departed from suche a counsaiour. PLA. Well I truste to verifie thy good opinion. But nowe a littel while answere to suche questions as I will demaunde the.

¶ Be not we agreed, that man is of soule and bodie, And that the soule is immortall and intelligible, but the bodie is mortall and sensible? ARI. Yes, no doubte therof. PLA. We be also accorded, that all other thynges in this worlde wer made chiefely for man ARI. Ye so god helpe me. PLA. And I trowe thou wilte not denie, that god is all goodnes, and that he made man vnto his owne image and similitude. ARI. So verily. PLA. If god made any thynge to the intent that it shulde

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be yll vnto man, whiche is his proper similitude, it shoulde than seme, that there shulde be some malice in god, whiche were not onely vntrue, but also to affirme horrible and vnlefull. Wherfore the contrarie muste nedes be true, that god made euery thyng to the intent that it shulde be good vnto man: But how that maie appere in suche thinges as thou hasse rehersed, which seme to be yll, theron resteth our question. Nowe take hede Aristippus. The soule of man beyng immortall neuer dieth or resteth to be, but after that it is ioygned with the bodie ethe bodie lyuyng, it liueth also, shewyng therby hir operations. And whan life departeth from the bodie, the soule also departeth immediately not withstanding she afterwarde liueth. Than if whan she was ioigned to the bodie, she retey-ned the senses and affectes in due obedi-ence, not sufferyng them to erede their

dnetie or offices, And haue vntill the separacion of hir from the bodie, enlued alwaie the counsaile of vnderstandyng and Reason, and so haue continewed in the forme of a man: Surely after hir departing from the bodie according as by hir operacion the bodie aboūded in vertues, so is she than immediately with god, whose similitude she so well hath kepte: and there is promoted to ioie and pleasure perpetuall more or lasse after hir merites. And that pleasure beyng intellectuall, shall more excede the dilectacions of the bodie, whiche onely be sensuall, than perfecte helthe doth excede sickenes, or the greatest reioisyng of the minde, that man mought possible haue of a sensual moci on, mought surmount the greattest discomforte or heuinesse. God desiryng that all soules mought come to this ioie, to warne them of their office, whom he seeth negligent, he suffreth the

the bodie, wherwith thei be ioigned (as I saide before) to be touched with sondrie afflictions, to the entent that thei perceiuyng howe vnable thei be, the lechor to execute his beastly pleasure in the feuer dowble tercian or ecthike, the proude man to aduance him selfe aboue other, beyng infected with leprie, or the lowsy sickenes called Phthiriasis, or stungen with the little and feble scorpion: he that is cruell and fierce, howe litle he maie preuaile against the colike passion, the stone, or the goute, or the falsehode of the adder, which as soone as he hath stunge the man, glideth forth with into the hedge, and escapeth the furie of hym, which beyng hurte, is not able to folow hym: The couaitouse merchaunt with his shippe cutteth the seas, and with his sailes and sterne presumeth to inforce the wyndes to brynge hym in to those costes, from whens he maie brynge home that miserable

trafike,

craftke, whereon he will consume all his studie and wit, and at the last leaue it to be consumed by other, while he is in the middes of his iournay vnder all his sailes, the wynde blowyng a good keole, and hauyng therwith a faire water, cometh the fisshe called Rémora, litell more than a gurnarde, and cleuing faste to the keele of the shippe, maketh hir tarie, and holdeth hir still without meuyng vntyll some tyme riseth a pirrie and breaketh all the tackelyng, so that the marchaunt is faine, if he will saue his lyfe, to flee awaie in a bote, and retourne home againe without money or marchandise. Amonge those thynges Aduersitee, or as it is more commonly called, frowarde or contrarious fortune, counteruaileth as muche as all this, wherof we haue spoken, and procedeth to the same effecte. ARIS. But what saiest thou, if he that is sicke, hurte with venym, or vexed with fortune,

tune, doue in nothyng reforme his liuyng, but in his peines or trouble do blaspheme God: and whan thei be withdrawen from hym, he is as yll, or perchance wars than he was before, shall we than suppose that thynge to be good or profitable, whereby he not onely is not reformed, but also made wars than he was erste? PLA. Inermaile that thou wilte demaunde any such question. I praie the, is the arte of a surgion good and profitable, or yll and vnprofitable? Answere me therto. ARI. Good and profitable, who will denie it? PLA. And he whiche in that arte is coumnyng and perfecte, is to that respecte good: and therfore is called a good surgion. ARI. Be that is true. PLA. Than thou doest admitte, that a surgion is good, and that his arte is good and profitable. But is his arte declared by any thynge els but by his medicines, or instrumentes,

wher-

wherwith he doth cutte, perse, or cautherize, as necessitee of the wounde or sore doeth require? ARI. Yes, there requireth also, that he knowe the nature & cause of the wounde or sore, and that he can well order his plaisters and oyntementes, and also vse handsomely the saide instrumentes. PLA. O Aristippus, thou arte nowe importunate, and wouldest put me to more busines than needeth, sens I rehersed, that surgion, whiche in his arte is counnynge and perfecte, what moueth the to put to this addicion, whiche is vaine and superfluous? as if that in him, whiche is perfect, mought any thing lacke, or that in perfect, thou woldest set degrees of comparison. But admitte for the case, that our surgion haue all thing that in that arte maie be required, and also that he be thy naturall father, whiche aboue all other, and with great affection loueth the: suppose also nowe

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for this tyme, that in eneriche of thine eies growe a fistule, wherby thou art in ieoperdie to lose thy sight, and also to haue thy visage therby defourmed: If thy father, desyryng to haue the healed, and knowyng (as thou spakest) the nature and cause of the saide fistule, wolde prepare suche remedies as were most expedient to cure the: wouldest thou refuse hym for thy good father, and accompte hym thine ennemie? ARI. Naie I trowe, than were it almes to hange me. PLA. That is hertily spoken Aristippus I make god a bowther fore I commende the. Than wilt thou loue him better than thou didst before? ARI. So ought I. For to that naturall benefite, that I receiued of him by my generation, he adderh so much humanitee and kindenes, in helpyng that I lose not my sight, wherby I shulde be depriued from al worldly comfort, and be also defourmed in my visage, which blemisshe

misshe shulde cause men that were ho-
norable to abhorre my presence. PLA.
Thou speakest reasonably. And there-
fore see that thou change not hereafter
this good opinion. Nowe thy father
doeth perceiue by his coumyng, that
this disease requireth sharpe medicines
as those, whiche be medicatiue or bi-
ting, abstersiue or clensing, or perchance
cautherizacion, that is to saie, that the
place corrupted be scorched with a hot
bournyng yron: whiche if thou wilte
pacientlye suffre, and vse euer after such
order in diet as thy father appoynteth
thee, thou shalte alwaie haue thy sight
sounde, and thy visage saufe and vnde-
formed: whiche shall be not to thy selfe
only, but also to thy father and surgi-
on, that cureth the, great ioie and com-
forte. But contrarie wise, whan thou
feleste the medicine worke sharpely, fret-
tyng and gnawyng in the flesshe that
is putrified, or els art touched with the
fire,

fire, which is in the hot glowyng yron, wherwith he doeth cautherize the soze: If than thou doest strine against thy surgion and father, that goth about to heale thee, murmuryng against him w̄ al disobedience and wordes of villanie, dispising his humanitee and kindenes, and refusyng to be cured by the saide remedies, either thou rubbest thyne eies, and remouest the medicine from the soze into all the sight of thyne eyes, or els struglyng contemtuously against the holsome hande of thy father, doest wilfully thrust the hournyng yron into thyne eies: than what meruaile is it, if that, whiche thy father ordeined to cure thee, nowe by thyne impatience and disobedience, tourne to thy damage: that is to saie, as well put clene out thy sight, as also deforme thy visage for euer? whiche thynge happenynge, maiste thou Aristippus by any reason blame therfore thy surgion? ARIS.

Naie in good faithe to saie truely.
PLA. What the medicine or instrument, whiche by thine impacience and foly thou didst conuerte from the place, where they shuld haue wrought for thy helthe, and didst thraste them into thine eies, wherby insued to thee more grefe and perill, shall we iudge the medicine or instrument therfore to be yll? And here remēbre well Aristippps the cause finall, and the degree and place in the line of order, whiche I haue before sufficiently declared. ARI. In good faithe I will not dissemble, I see nothing here that ought to be called yll: but I my selfe, if I were in the case, that thou hast now purposed. PLA. If thou holde the there, we shall soone be agreed. Also if nowe thou being blinde, and the *fistula* growing euery daie greatter, and gretter, the deformitee of thy visage more and more, thou not onely refusest to receiue any medicine, but also doest mur-
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mure against thy good father, cursyng hym for his medicine geuyng, whiche through thine owne folie and wilfulnes is conuerted from remedie vnto thy damage. If than thy father beholdyng the to be incurable, and also malicious towarde hym, without hope of amendment, did exclude the out of his companie, refusyng thee for his soonne, supposest thou that for this he shuld be called an yll father or surgion? ARI. No in good faith: seing that euery thyng that he doth is with good iustice and reason. PLA. But he is stil good as he was before, and also that which he doth now for the due punishyng of a disobedient and vnnaturall soonne, is as well good, as that which he did before, to the intent to cure him of his maladie, if he wold haue ben patient and suffre those medicines, which were prepared to heale him. ARI. Ye in good faith. PLA. Well said Aristippus. Nowe wilt thou see, what I

meane hereby: Is any so proprely thy father as god, whiche is the first, the chiefe, and immediate cause of thy generacion: or is any surgeon so cunning as he, whiche seeth more plainely the originall mocion and cause of euery disease of the soule, that is to saie, of vicious affectes, than any man can see the outwarde sore and scurfe of the fistula: And more perfectely knoweth the beast remedie therfore, than any surgion knoweth howe to heale a small whelke in a childes finger. ARI. No surely, in that thou saist truly. PLA. Now sens ones thou hast graunted to me, that vice is yll, because it is contrarie to vertue, whiche thou affirmedst to be good: suppose vice to be y sickenes of the soule, as it is in deed, and for as much as it bringeth in ignorance, whiche is ennemie to reason and knowlage, who be as the eies of the soule, and if it grow much, it deformeth the soule, and putteth clene

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awaie vnderstandyng, whiche is the visage wherin (as I said) is the similitude of god: therfore resemble it vnto the fistula, whiche foule and dangerous disease God as a louyng father and good surgion espiyng in thee, and desiryng to heale the therof, doth his cure more spedily and quickely, he vseth sharpe medicines, touchyng the with sickenes (wherin I recken as well diseases growynge in the bodie as also hurte or griefes by outwarde occasion or chance) or with Aduersitee, by wrongefull imprisonment, death of assured frendes, towardly children, or of a wife, constant and pacient, losse of thy princis fauour, or great authoritee, possessions, or mouable richesse, or other like temporall benefite: If thou sufferyng this paciently doest thankefully receiue thy fathers kyndnes and industrie in curyng of thee, and exactely obserue the diete, wherto he doeth appoint the: that is to

 saie,

saie, doest liue in the custome of vertue, eschuyng vicious communication, yll counsaile, and flatterie, which be the vnholsom and quaisiemeates of the soule, whechy is ingendred the venemous humour of yll opinion, wherof commeth vice, whiche I haue resembled vnto the Pistule; thou shalt be cured and haue the sight and visage of thy soule preserued pure and cleane: contrarie wise, if thou murmour or grudge at the saide remedies, estemyng them as greses and no medicines, blamyng or repriuyng God as vndiscrete or cruell in the ministracion of them, and striuing there against with the power of thy senses, vsing them dishonestly in some pleasure voluptuous, thou tournest them from the sore, wheron thei shulde worke, and with them doest thou put out reason and knowlage, the eies of the soule: And than for thy folyshenesse, impatience, & blasphemie, God sufferyng thy soule to

be

he both blinde with Ignorance, and be-
fourmed with vice, sens thou hast utter-
ly loste his glorious similitude, he will
from thens foorthe abiecte thee, and
for thyne unkindenesse committe thee
to perpetuall prisone, there to be puni-
shed in darkenes, where thy foule be-
fourmed visage shall never be seene, to
the reproche of hym, unto whose simili-
tude thou were created. Come Ari-
stippus sens thou didst approve that,
whiche was doone by the carnall father
and surgeon to be good, because he
did it with Justice and reason, what
saist thou to that, which God ordeineth
and doeth, who so far excelleth in those
two qualitees, that the iustice execu-
ted among men that be mortal, in com-
parison of his iustice, is wronge: and
that whiche we take for reason, in re-
gard of his wisdom, is folishnes and fan-
tasie, not because it is not iustice & rea-
son that we have: but because that, which

is in God, is euer one and perfect with
out any diuision or mixture: ARI. In
good faith Plato, I wot not well what
to saie to thee. Finally I am compel-
led by that argument, that thou hast e
made to agree, that suche thynges, whi-
che before semed to me to be yll, be to
that respecte, whyche thou hast reher-
sed, good and profitable: that is to saie,
in the reformyng of mans soule, where
it is curable, and in the declaracion of
the iustice of God, where man is incu-
rable. But what saiest thou to that,
whiche thou hast so lightly passed ouer?
I meane where the saide diseases and
afflictions happen to hym, whiche is all
redy good, and needeth not so sharpe re-
formation: PLA. Why Aristippus,
supposest thou, that euer any man was
so good, that in hym were neuer vici-
ous affection? Verily our maister So-
crates, whan he was yonge, & wrought
in a maions shoppe with his father,

was

was not so pure from affectes, as he was after that he had ben the herer of Anaragoras: by whose doctrine, and also beinge continually vered with pouertie, sondrie reproches, and somtime stripes of malicious and quarellyng persons: Also with the continuall and neuer ceassyng braulyng and chidyng of his most cursed wife Xanthippa, whiche he called his domesticall exercise, he by the gentyll vertue of pacience became a good man, as he was called and taken. But to thentente that thy minde maie be satisfied, let vs nowe admitte, that men, whiche be good, or at the leste haue suche abundance of vertue, and so littell dooe incline to vicious affectes, that it requireth not, that thei be purged with suche sharpe afflictions, as we haue spoken of. Howe saiest thou? supposest thou, that vnto them thy said afflictions be yll and vnprofitable?

ARI. Ye verely. And also if it were

 lefull

lefull to speake it, me semeth that therin god dealeth not with all men indifferently. PLA. Surely Aristippus that is not onely vnlefull to speake, but also to thinke it is great presumpcion and folie. And that shall I well proue, if thou wilte attentifely here me. ARIS. Speake on hardily. PLA. In all the traine of our communicacion hitherto, sens we began to speake of prouidence, it hath alwaie appered, that god is father to man by creacion, & loueth man aboue all his creatures: But what saiest thou. Is there any more token of loue, than whan the father with all his studie & power endeuoreth him selfe to bring his sonne to great honour, which if he maie bring to good passe, there is nothing maie cause him so muche to reioyce? ARI. Surely nothyng. PLA. And to the intent that his son maie be demed of al mē worthie to be promoted to honour, he accustometh hym to trauaile

naile either in learning and studie, or
else in corporall exercise, the one to make
him wise, the other to make him strong
and haliant in hardie, whereby he may
declare him selfe worthie to have pro-
motion. And wise fathers, the better
that thei loue their sonnes, the more di-
ligent be thei. And as I ought saie,
the more importune in keeping them in
continuall exercise, thinking that there-
by the strēgthe & delinernesse of the har-
die increaseth, and if it be in studie of
minde, wit is augmented: like as con-
trarie wise by sluggardie and idelnes
the saide activitee is appalled, and the
wittes consumed: wherby men be
made vnapte for the life which is active
or politike. ARI. I suppose that hithers
to thou hast saide truely. PLA. If the
sonne be of gentill disposition, and like
to his father, perteining his fathers ho-
nest desire and purpose, and therwith
beyng inflamed with desire of glorie,

is

he wyll not onely content hym with labour, but also if his father doe bryng hym unto any great tournament or wrastlyng, he wyll prepare hym selfe to refuse no man, whiche wyll offre to assaile him. And whan he beholdeth one come against hym, whiche is of suche puissance, that in his sight hath vanquished or ouerthrowen men mo than an hundred, although nature somewhat thoucheth hym with feare, yet remembryng that his father beholdeth hym, who hath so taught hym and geuen him comforte, that he shall not be vanquished, excepte he will, and that his herte faile hym: consideryng also the price of the battaile or wrastlyng, whiche is honour lasse or more after the estimacion of his prowesse in vanquishyng the moste stronge and dangerous champions: wyll he not (trowest thou) abide sternely his aduersarie, and receiue his assaultes ioyousely, without any shrinkyng

hyng? And awaite whan his aduersaries strengthe doth decrese, or his breth faileth, that he than inforsyng his might, ioinyng therunto policie, maie ouerthrowe hym. And so with muche gladnesse and commendacion of all the beholders, of whom some peraduenture at the beginnyng iudged hym foolehardie, he shall receiue the honour that he hath deserued: to his owne cōforte and to the incredible ioie of his good father, who aboue all thynges wisshed to see this conclusion? ARI. This accordeth well, and standeth with good reason.

PLA. Now hath he that thynge, wherfore his father brought hym up so diligently. And the whiche he hym selfe beyng like to his father of his naturall inclinacion desyred. ARI. Be verelie.

PLA. Had he it geuen to hym for any thyng els, but because he approued him selfe to be valiant and hardie, whereof honour was the price and rewarde

ARI. So I suppose. PLA. Wherewith did he approue him selfe in suche wise to haue wonne that honour? By any other thyng than by ouerthrowing or banquishinge his puissant aduersaries? ARI. No truly. PLA. Than it semeth, that without a puissant aduersarie, his hardinesse and prowesse coulde neuer haue ben proued? ARI. No, that well appereth. PLA. And without prose, hardines or strengthe is a voice vaine and of none effecte or profite? ARI. That is verie trewe. PLA. For as much as prose is the operaciō, whereby the saide qualitees, hardines and strength be expressed, is it not so? ARI. Yes verily. PLA. Yet am I glad, that thou art so reasonable: it mai perchāce tourne the to some cōmoditee. But Aristippus, as we remembred while ere, in those exercises, whiche be commonly called games, be diuers prices, one more than an other, and thei be geuen

uen to men accordyng to the ſtrengthe that thei haue emploied, which is iudged by the compariſon of their ſtrengthe, whom thei haue excelled: to ſome the firſt game or price, to an other the ſeconde, and ſo in order. ARI. And that is but reaſon. PLA. And doeſt thou not thinke theſe exerciſes to be good and profitable, whereby thou ſhalt winne a rewarde, and alſo worſhyp, with comforte alſo vnto thy father, and increace of his loue and fauour towarde the? ARI. Yes in good faith. PLA. And alſo thou woldſt loue him better than euer thou dydſt, If often times he brought the to that, whereby thou ſhuldeſt receiue ſuche profite and worſhip? ARI Ye I were bounde ſo to doe. PLA. Ariſtiſtippus, woteſt thou where we be nowe? ARI. What is that Plato? PLA. We be nowe at the concluſion, the whiche thou haſte ſo longe gaped and loked for. That is to ſaie? It

ſhall

shall palainely appere vnto thee, that the sondrie afflictions, that do happen to good men, come not without prouidence, and the goodnesse of god, ne be yll and vnprofitable to them that do patiently suffre them. Therfore I praie thee Aristippus, while I declare to the patience, doo thou patiently here me, And I shall sooner than thou wenest, sette out to thine eie, that we two haue sought for: I meane that knowlage, wherin wisedome is hid. And than like as the minar, whiche after he hath founde the place, where the vaine of golde lieth, laboureth busily to digge vp the Oore, and after ceasseth not to trie it from the stones, and with continuall trauaile to fynde out the pure golde: so shalte thou, ones hauyng the said knowlage, neuer cesse to trauaile in the exercise of thy life, to finde out wisedome. ARI. I am verie well content and desyrous to here, howe thou

wilte

bryng to passe that meruailous conclusion. PLA. Thou remembrest Aristippus, that we were agreed longe agone, that for as muche as God is perfectly good, and the fountaine, from whense all goodnes procedeth: All that is yll is contrary and ennemie to god? ARI. Ye, I am not so shorte witted, but that I remembre all that thou hast spoken, if thou in this wise doest eftesones reherse it. PLA. That is well saide. And thou haste not denied, but that he is the first mouer, and without hym nothyng is moued, or done. ARI. No, I wyll not denie it. PLA. Sens good and yll can not procede from one fountaine, god neuer moueth to yll, nor doeth any thyngs that is yll, what saist thou therto? ARI. I muste nedes graunt that, excepte I wyll repugne vnto reason. PLA. We were also agreed, that god created the serpent, the scorpipion, the denemous fishes and her-

bes, as well as them, which were commodious and holsome: & that he made all thynge for man, whom he loued aboue all his creatures. ARI. Be that is true. PLA. Also nothyng happeth without hym, whiche is the firste and principall mouer, either helthe or sickenesse, prosperitee or aduersitee, richesse or powertee, and he beareth the kais of life and deathe. For he that made and did put the soule into the bodie, hath the power to plucke it out: supposest thou, that any other hath with hym equall authoritee? ARI. No. I graunted longe agone, that as he is one in begynnyng, so is he euer one in gouernance, and maie suffer no piere or like in equalitee. PLA. That is remembred very well of thee Aristippus. Nowe by that we two haue gathered, it appereth (and if thou looke well) that nothyng is made yll of god. And than rede we no further argumente, But

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sens god made all thynges for man, whom he loueth, what exterior thinge so euer happeth to any good man, it is good. And therfore sickenesse, aduersitee, and deathe, if thei happen to a good man, be good. And therfore it shulde suffice to a good man, if he suffre any of the saide afflictions, to thinke and saie to him selfe: God whiche sent to me this, is all good, and hath in him none yll, nor any yll proceedeth of hym: and I am one of the nombre of those creatures, whom he loueth beste: wherfore sens that he hath sent me, is good and not yll, it is necessarie, that I be therwith contented, and take heede that with mine opinion I make not that yll, whiche is good.

¶ But although this were sufficient to satisfie a good man, who woide not labour to seke any further in the prouidence of god: Yet to the Aristippus, who beyng longe nosilled in worldly

pleasures, wilt not admitte, that anye thynge, whiche is thereunto contrarie, maie be expedient or necessarie vnto a man, that is vertuous, and lacketh suche vice, whiche requireth sharpe admonicion: and therfore when requirest a more ample and large declaracion: I will set out a more plaine prose, in applying my reasons to the examples and similitudes, whiche I haue alredy induced.

¶ God who made man vnto his image and loueth hym with more feruent affection than any carnall father loueth his childe, bringeth vs vp in the exercise of the commune imbecilitee or feblenesse of our nature, as hunger, thurste, colde, wearines after labour, annoiance, displeasures, whiche do happen in the societee or liuing of men together, diseases, wherin is no temperature, and suche other litell incommodities, incident to mortalitee: of all the whiche no man maie be quite, declaring

ring vnto vs by vnderſtandyng, that in this life we muſt of neceſſitee trauaile and ſuffer, therwith geuyng vs comforte, that who ſo euer by this exerciſe waxeth ſtronge and hardie, hereafter beyng brought where he ſhal proue his ſtrengthe againſt puiſſant and mighty aduerſaries, that is to ſaie anguiſh and peine, ſharpe and perillous ſickenes, cruell aduerſitee in any thyng that fortune ſemeth to rule, loſſe of children, frendes, or fauour of princes, priſonment, or exile, and other like tourmentes, and veracions of bodie and minde: if he valiantly do reſiſt, and with fortitude, whiche is the ſtrengthe of the minde do ſubdue and vanquiſhe thoſe aduerſaries, he ſhall haue the rewarde that belongeth to good men, whiche no tyme can conſume, no power can minuiſhe, none enuil can deface. And to whette the courage of man to deſire this enterpriſe, god geueth to hym this

comforte, that these thinges, whiche shall so shaurely assaile him, be ordeined onely to proue his strengthe, and that they be inferiours vnto him, if he put out his strengthe to the vttermoste, sens god, whiche loueth him aboue all his creatures, hath ordeined nothyng to the intent to distroie him, but to his benefite, if he doo but employe his power and will therunto, accordyng as he hath receiued them.

¶ Nowe if the soule haue in the bodie suche dominion and rule, And that man be in his right faction (as I saide longe a go that is to saie lyke to his father: of his noble nature he desireth to wynne that incomparable price, whiche is promised to them that shall be so happie to gette the victorie, wherfore in this wise he armeth therto his courage.

¶ Furder he considereth that his father is good, and that he moste tender-

ly

ly loueth hym. Also that he brought hym not vp from the firste tyme that he liued, in those littell exercises of naturall infirmitee in vaine or without any purpose. But to the intent that thereby he shall feele (as it were) the sente of more greuous afflictions, wher of thei be but the shadowes, and by a littell labour and sufferance, he shall prepare him selfe, to susteine and contemne a more greatter trauaile and patience. He reuolueth also in his mynde, that euery man, which in his herte desireth honour, couaiteth some honest occupacion or labour, and is prompte and alwaie forwarde to do his office or duetie in euery perill or dangier. For, to what wise and diligent man is it not a peine to be ideil? And yet where ideines is not, nedes must be labour. And where an aduersarie lacketh, prowesse lieth hid and vnknowen. What a man mai or maie not pa-

ſience declareth. The fathers bede their children to applie them earneſtly to ſtudie or labour, and will not let them be idle, although it be holy daie, and doe conſtreigne them to ſweate, and often times to weepe. Where the mothers wolde ſet them on their lappes, and kepe them at home all the daie in the ſhadow for burnyng their white. God hath towarde good men and women the myndes of a father, and beſt doeth loue them: and therfore he vereth them with ſondrie buſines, griefes, and damages, that thei maie therby gather a ſubſtanciall ſtrengthe, ſens thei which be franked vp in Idelnes, do become vniuſtie, and with their owne burdeine be ſhortely ſuffocat. It is to men no litle pleaſure to beholde a ponge man, that with a good courage receiueth on his ſpeare a wilde boze, or a great harte comyng vpon hym: or without feare abideth with his ſwoꝛde in his hande

the

the fierce Lion, which cometh to assaile hym. But these are not the thynges, where to god deigneth to tourne ones his looke, beyng but trifles and onely pleasures of mans vanitee and lightnes. For the sight, whiche is worthie to haue god the beholder therof, is to see the creature, whiche he loueth best, to trie his strengthe with fortune or anguishe, if he be chalenged, for therby strengthe, which is a vertue and parte of that diuine portion, wherby man is like vnto god, is proued: the other strengthe, as it is of the bodie, so is it, as the bodie is, commune with beastes: and as it is more fraile and vncertaine than the selfe bodie, in like wise the price or rewarde that it deserueth, or rather loseth for, is vncertaine, and also inconstant. But looke to the other fortitude or strengthe, whiche is patient resistence of suche thynges, whiche opinion doth set forthe, with a terrible

vilage of damage or greke. If thou be ſicke, the humours, wherof thy bodie is made, do but their nature, choler contendeth with fleume, bloud with melancolie: the one couaiteth to vanquiſhe the other: that whiche is hotte, refuſeth to be colde: moyſture and drouthe will not abide in one place: by this variance thei haſte them to their diſſolucion. If this contencion be curable, hope maketh it tollerable: And if the woꝛſt fall, death ſhall diſſolue it, foꝛ it is not foꝛ aie oꝛ perpetuall.

¶ Aduerſitee is not greuous, becauſe it is out of the bodie, and nothyng compelleth vs to ſuffre but our owne willes. Foꝛ if we were content with that, whiche onely our nature hath geuen vs, we ſhuld not be conſtreigned to knowe what that wooꝛde Aduerſitee meute. But ſens we contemne hir as nedie and miſerable, and ſue to come in to the ſeruice of foꝛtune,

whoſe

whose nature is to be alwaie mutable, & euer incõstant, nor geueth any thyng, but lendeth it onely. If we receiue any thyng of hir mockishe hande, what shall it greue vs to paie that againe, whiche we haue borowed? Why shuld we either be vngentill creditours, or be angrie, that we can not tourne the nature of hir that wyll not obeie or folowe any mans commaundement or counsayle, but maie be subdued with patience, where she can neuer be vanquished with reason? Moreouer god is content, that we shall excell hym in that, that he mai not suffre yll, and we maie by sufferance subdue it.

For he is in more estimacion, that hath ouercome a puissant and valiant enemie, than he whiche hath none ennemie at all. Thou receiuest of thy father this comforte, that no man liueth so poorely in the worlde, as he came into it. And he hath nede of a littell, that mea-

measureth abundance by natures ne-
cessitee, and not by superfluitee of ambi-
cions desire. Greese shall dissolue, or
elles be dissolued. Fortune hath not so
sharpe a weapon, that it maie bite on
the soule. And whom she lengest sup-
porteth, and with moste abundance of
all thynge, them for a generall rule god
littell fauoureth: sens there is no re-
warde, where lacketh merite. Contra-
riwise the ende of trauaile is ease: And
the father, whiche beholdeth his sonne
labour mightily, reioiceth therat, and
prepareth, that after his labour he mai
liue pleasantly. Who knowyng a great
heape of golde to be hyd on the toppe of
a rough hill, wold not crepe vp through
thornes and brembles to fetche it? and
although his visage and handes were
scratched, and his bodie and legges
greuously pricked, yet wolde he not cesse
vntyll he came to the toppe. And if any
man, whiche beheldе hym thus tra-
uailyng,

nailyng, wolde call him wretched and foolishe: he saiyng nothyng, wolde thynke howe happie and welthie he shall be, whan he hath opteined that thynge, wherfore he laboureth, And doeth laughe at the ignorance or folie of them, whiche for a peine that endureth not longe, will forbeare to gae with hym, and to be partners of that, wherby thei shall euer after be welthie. ¶ Golde is a corruptible matter, and shall ones be consumed, but that treasure, wherfore mans soule ought to labour, maie neuer be wasted, or in any qualitee or quantitee appaired or minished: that is to saie, it shall euer be like good and like muche. Wherfore what peine so euer be taken aboute the gettyng therof, it is not grieuous, hauyng respecte to the gaine. For he that trauaileth therfore maie be named miserable or wretched: sens Misorie is the priuation or lacke of al maner of co-

fort.

forte. For in hope of victorie if thou faile not thy selfe, comforte is redie if thou doest not refuse it. In so muche as nothyng is miserable, but if thou doest so thinke it. For all fortune is good to him that cõstantly suffreth. And who was ever so fortunate, that whã he was subdued with impacience, dyd not desire to change his estate? Suffiseth it not to the, that he that vanquisheth, is deemed honorable, and he that is retreant, is wretched and miserable? How shall it be knowen, on what parte thou standest, without an experience? If thou haue alwaie good wyll, strengthe neuer faileth thee: but if by the puissance of fortune thou be set on thy knee, haue a good herte, for god standeth at thyne elbowe, and if thou thinke on hym, he wyll set the vp, and make thy strengthe double as muche as it was. Wilt thou lerne one good point of defence, whiche maie perchance

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dooe the ease ageinst some dangerous assaultes?

¶ Fortune hath taken from the that, whiche she had lent to the. Revolue than in thy minde, that either those thynges were not good in dede, as thei were supposed to bee, or els man is in better astate than God is hym selfe: for them, whiche we haue, God vseth not, as carnall dilectacion, pleasant and deintie meates, orient iewelles, or great treasure of money, these perteine not to God. Than is it to be thought, that either God lacketh those thinges, that be good, and than lacketh in hym beatitude or perfection of ioie: or els it is a good argument, that those thinges be not good, that God will not vse, but is contented to lacke. Finally those be very gooddes, that be within vs geuen by reason. For thei be sure and duryng, nor can not decaie or minishe for any occasion. Thei that be without vs,

lent

lent onely by fortune, thei be good by opinion onely. And though thei participate their name with the other, yet is there not in them the propretie or nature of goodnesse, for they be not durable: and also thei be often times the occasion of euill: Wherfore thei bee for the more parte with yll men as moste apte for their nature. And sewe good men haue them, or thei dôoe continue but a littel tyme with them, by the iuste ordinance of God, leste the muche vsing of them shulde bringe dilectacion into the senses: whereby thei mought be prouoked to rebell. And Vnderstandyng, whiche is occupied in contemplacion of the diuine maiestee, mought be sodainly expelled. And the soule lacking counsell, shulde giue place to carnall affections and appetites. Thou remembrest Theognides verses.

¶ God geueth to yll men good fortune and substance.

Whiche

Whiche be not the better to them selfe nor their frende.

There is aie lacke, where is inconstance.

But honour of vertue doeth indure without ende.

☞ Finally there is no greatter comfoyte to him that is good, than to be sene in the companie of good men. If thou seekest for a good carpenter, or a good smith as thou goest through the citee, thou herknest where is most hewing or beatyng with hamers, and there thou goest in, and supposest to finde hym, that thou lokest for. Semblably, if thou wilt haue a good man, go looke him out, where thou hearest that sharpe sickenes reigneth, or where iniustice gouerneth, will ruleth, great power oppresseth: there shalte thou fynde him, that thy herte desireth. Thou maiest well accompte hym for a great foole, that to liue double his naturall life, wolde not abide to be ones or twise

lanced in the moste tender parte of his bodie, or wolde not begge his bread for one twelue moneth, to be a kynge afterwarde dureyng his life. Stande boldely againſt ſickenes and fortune, the one is naturall, the other is caſuall. In the firſte is neceſſitee, whiche wyll thou or no, thou muſte ſuffre: If thou doeſt it willyngly, thou knoweſt the price, If thou addeſt to angre, thou doubleſt thy peine. In the ſeconde is no neceſſitee, for thou moughteſt alwaie refuſe it, as well whan it was proſperous, knowyng it to be vnſtable, and burdeinous, as alſo whan it is aduerſe or contrarious, conſideryng that it was neuer ſo muche thyne owne, that thou hadſt any ryght to retayne it, ſens it was ordeined for other as well as for thee. And fortune, whiche is the diſpoſer therof, neuer made bargayne with thee, that thou ſhouldeſt ſtyll kepe it:

And

And if she dyd, brynge forthe thy recordes. She lacketh not witnesses innumerable, to proue that she hath ben euer inconstant. Defie hir malice: for whan she hath doone hir warste, yet shalte thou haue more than thou broughtest with thee. And that whiche aboundeth, shall come of thyne industrie, and not of hir false liberalitee. And if thou doest boldely resiste hir, thou shalte haue that aduancement and richesse geuen thee of God, wherin she shall haue no powar or authoritee, whiche shall be suche as the hundred thousande parte therof, shall sourmount all that euer she gaue, sens she was first called Fortune.

¶ Nowe howe saiest thou Aristippus, be those thynges, whiche thou didst suppose to be annoiances and incommoditees, iniustely sente vnto good men: or hauing respecte to order, and the cause finall, that is to saie to the ende,

whereunto thei were ordeined, whiche I haue declared, be thei vnto them ne-cessarie and moste expedient? ARIS. Nowe in good faithe thou hast brought me to that point, that I wote not what to saie to thee. PLA. But yet kepe thy promise, and tell to me, what thou thinkest in this matter. ARI. Me seemeth by thy reason, that peine and aduersitee be as expedient to them, whiche be good, as labour and busines to them, whiche be industrious. PLA. And wherfore? Go to Aristippus, be not ashamed to confesse the trouthe, though it be contrarie to thy profession. ARI. In dede thou haste almoste made me change mine olde opinion. But sens thou hast gotten me into suche a straite, that I can not sterte, from that I haue promised: I wyll nowe confesse, that the cause why the saide afflictions be expedient for good men, is for as muche as therby thei be not onely preserued

still

ſtill in their right image or figure: but alſo for their conſtance in trauaile, thei ſhall receiue that inestimable reward, whiche thou ſaidſt was ordeined for good men. PLA. Ah good Ariſtippus. Nowe I perceiue, that the ſedes, whiche Socrates had ſowen in thy mynde, doo begin nowe to ſpringe with this littell watering: whereunto if thou wilte adde to thy diligence in pluckyng vp the weedes of wanton affections, as ſone as thei begin to appere in thy mynde: thou ſhalte ſhortly perceiue the fruites of wiſdome (for the whiche we do ſeke) ſpring abundantly, with whoſe moſte delectable fruition thou ſhalt neuer be ſaciate.

¶ But nowe ſens we haue treated of ſondrie matters (ſith we firſt entred into communication) leſte hereafter thou maiſte repute me for one of them, whiche doo ſpeake of many thinges, and conclude vpon none, and ſo accompte

me but for a babler: Let vs examine, if our matter haue hither to hanged well togither, or if there haue ben any vaine digression, which serued nothing to the purpose that we firste intended: or what thinge lacketh nowe, whiche maie make to our communication a sufficient ende or conclusion. And I praie the, thinke not the time tedious, that is saued from ydelnes, & we haue nowe littell more than two miles to ryde. And I truste so to moderate my selfe, that we shall at one tyme arryue both at the citee, and at the conclusion of our matter that we haue pourposed.

ARI. Shall I tell the truthe Plato, it is lasse griefe to me to abide the resydue, all though thou woldest talke two daies continually, than it was at the begynnyng to abide herying one houre, suche swetenes I fele nowe in thy reasonyng. Therfore doe what thou wilt, for I haue both myne eares and my

mynde

mynde wide open to receiue all that thou ſpeakeſt. PLA. I am glad therof. Therfore prepare nowe thy memorie readie, or if thou haſt any thyng forgotten, call it againe with thy remembrance. ARI. I will do as thou bidſt me, therfore ſaie on Plato, and ſpare not.

The fifte dialogue.

PLATO.

THe firſte entre into our diſputacion Ariſtippus, (if I be not forgetfull and vnlike to that I was wonte to be) was, that thou beheldeſt me in this poore aſſate and apparaile, the occaſion wherof I declared to the in the forme of a ſtorie: whiche although it ſemed to the to be more than in the anſwere of a Philoſopher was expedient, whiche

shulde vse in fewe woordes muche matter and quicke to the purpose: yet examinyng diligently euery thyng therin included, it shall well apere vnto the, that nothyng therof moughte haue ben omitted, the woordes, whiche we spake before, with my professiõ beyng well pondered. ARI. Me thinketh thou saiest truely, nowe that I haue considered euery thynge depely. PLA. But yet Aristippus, as I dooe consider, me seemeth, to that purpose that we go about, the argument, whiche I haue made, lacketh yet somewhat to make it perfecte. ARI. Trowest thou so? In good faithe I do not perceiue it, for as me semeth, thou haste touched euery thynge handsomely. PLA. I am glad, that it doeth so well please thee. But Aristippus, thou doest remembre, that we were bothe agreed, that wisedome is knowlage? ARI. Yt that is truthe, and so haue I herde it alwaie defined.

PLA.

PLA. But se whether that knowlage only maketh one to be called a wise man. Is not wisdome good? What saiest thou therto? ARI. Why thynkest thou, that I am suche a foole, that I will denie it? PLA. No, so I trowe. Nowe admitte that a man knowe all that we haue hitherto talked of, concernyng the goodnes and prouidence of God: but indede he letteth his senses and affectes haue the rule ouer his soule, and in his actes abuseth the saide goodnesse and prouidence. If thou perceiuidst him to doo this, woldest thou suppose him to be a good man. ARI. No verily. PLA. Thou woldest saie perchance, that he were yll, because that his actes were contrarie to good: but to his knowlage thou wouldest take little regarde. ARI. In good faith thou saiest truly. PLA. If a man named to be a tilar wolde tell the, that thy house were yll tiled, and that the mozier was

yll tempred, by reason that the lime was to hotte, and the holes of the tiles were made to wyde for the pinnes, and that the lathes were rent in the nailing, and thou foundeſt all that he ſaide to be true: thou wouldeſt ſuppoſe hym to be a good tilar. But if commyng to his owne houſe thou ſhuldeſt fynde it negligently couered by hym, his tiles and lath ſo ſet out of order, that the raine and ſnowe did beate into euery place, wherby the beames and rafters of the houſe were decaied and rotten, and therby all the houſe in ieoperdie to fall downe euery houre: woldeſt thou call hym than a good tilar or no?

ARI. Nay in good faithe, I welde call hym but a prater. PLA. Becauſe that where he ought moſte, he did not practiſe his cunnyng, whiche he had often auanted. ARI. Ye in good faithe. PLA. And that were but reaſon. Than it ſemeth, that knowlage is indifferent

to

to good and yll: but although goodnes beyng in knowlage, maketh that knowlage to be good, yet he whiche hath that goodnes, is neuer the more a good man, excepte by the exercise of the same goodnes the thinge that is good appereth in his act. For that is manifest, and declareth what the man is, knowlage is secrete, and bringeth forthe no frute but by operation. And thou arte agreed, that wisedome is good. Wherfore no more than knowlage of goodnesse maketh one to be named a good man, so no more doth knowlage of wisedome onely cause any persone to be named a wise man. And that was affirmed by the in the beginnyng of our communication: where it was agreed, that kynge Dionyse desyred to see me, to the intent that he mought beholde, if in my countenance, speche, and forme of liuyng I dyd expresse that thynge, wherfore he herde me commended, whiche

whiche was nothyng but wisedome.
Than If I were a wise man, it ought
to be declared by operacion, whiche is
not in man without knowlage prece-
dyng or goyng before, wherof proce-
deth election, whiche lacketh natural-
ly in other beastes. Wherfore although
wisedome be knowlage, yet by know-
lage, onely none maie be called a wise
man, but operacion of that whiche is
in knowlage, called wisedome, expres-
syng the wisedome, maketh the user or
exercyser therof to be iustly named a
wise man. ARI. Nowe on my faithe
Plato, thou art a wonderfull felowe:
for by the subtyll persuasions brought
in by induction, whiche forme of argu-
ing I knowe is moste naturall, thou
compellest me to assente alwaie to thy
reason. for nowe me thinketh, that
none maie be called a wise man, ex-
cepte vnto that knowlage, wherin is
wisdome, he ioigneth operacion: but
for

for what purpose I praie thee hast thou brought in nowe this last conclusion? PLA. Art thou so dull witted Aristippus, that all this while thou doest not perceiue it? Verelie the occasion of all our longe reasonyng and rise of that, that I assaied to proue, that if I were a wise man in dede, mine answere to kynge Dionyse declared me to be so, according to his expectation. And therfore first as reason was, I sought for wisedome. And in our communication it appered to be in man onely, and not in beastes: and that it was in knowlage of hym selfe and other. And that knowlage was in this wise declared. First to know his owne preeminence and dignitee ouer all other creatures, it was remembred, that he was of bodie and soule, wherby he was man, and was made to the image and similitude of god, and that all other creatures were made onely for hym and

to

to his vse principally. The saide similitude was expressed to be in the soule, as well for that it is visible and immortal, as also in vnderstandyng, whereby she hath soueraineetee and rule in the bodie, as God hath ouer all vniuersally. Moreouer, that the senses, affectes, and will be the seruantes and ministers: whiche yf she dooe keepe in suche obedience and order, as she receiued them, she shall euer remaine in authoritee. But if she let theim to haue more libertee, than perteineth to them, that is to saie, to delite in thinges, whiche be corruptible, thei will than conspire and rebell against vnderstandyng, and driue him from the soule, and than shoulde man be transformed from the image of God vntyll a brute beaste, being gouerned and ruled onely by senses.

¶ The seconde parte of the saide knowlage was opened by the discription of the

the goodnes and prouidence of God. In describyng his goodnes, was declared his power, his perfection, and loue that he hath vnto man, as vnto his childe more than naturall. In settyng out his prouidence appered his inscrutable wisedom, magnificence, prudence, and policie in his wonderfull order, wherin were his creatures in their sondrie degrees higher or lower, as thei did participate in goodnes more or lasse. In the toppe wherof aboue all other, Man was set nerte vnto god, from whom order proceded. Moreouer, by the saide prouidence it was declared, that nothyng kepyng his place in order, shewed to man by vnderstandyng, mought be yll vnto him, but alwaie profitable, all though to the senses some thynges did seme to be yll and vnprofitable. And lasse of all it was proued in a fewe sentences, that aduersitee was sent by God vnto a good man,

not

not inuſtly or cruelly, but for a good conſideracion and louyngely, as of a good father, whiche with an incompa-rable charitee, deſyryng to aduance his ſonne to perpetuall honours and dignitee, by ſuche maner of exercise proueth his vertue.

¶ Nowe Ariſtippus, reuoluyng all this in thy mynde, whiche in a ſhorte Epy-logacion I haue endeuoured my ſelfe to reduce vnto thy remembrance, Con-ſider well both me and kynge Dionyſe, as we were at that tyme, whan we were togither. Thou knoweſt well, that from the tyme that I was .xx. ye-res olde, I alwaie continued diſciple of Socrates, vntill that he died. Who (as thou knoweſt) the anſwere of God de-termined to be of all mortall men the wiſeſt. And that whiche I lerned of hym, was wiſedome: whiche as he e-uer affirmed, was included in theſe two wordes, *Knowe thy ſelfe*. And by that doc-

doctrine (as thou maist remembre) he abated the presumption of diuers, whiche the supposed them selfe to be excellent wise men. Also reuoked many, that were dissolute and resolued into vice, and made them to ensue vertue. And by his example of liuyng he prouoked men to contemne fortune, and to haue onely vertu in reuerence. And also thereby, laste of all, whan he was iniustely condemned to death, he constantly and wilfully suffered to haue the mortall bodie dissolued, that the soule mought be at rest, & haue it immortall reward. Whiche example geuen of him, was the corroboracion of all his doctrine, and no laste parte of lernyng vnto his scholers, but rather muche more than his often disputacions or lessons. Imagine Aristippus, that I was so studious and industrious aboute the saide lernyng, that I moste curiously, & as I mought saie) superstitiously obserued euery

poynte of the saide doctrine. And that therfore all men in Greece, and also kynge Dionyse had conceiued of me an opinion, that I was a wise man. And that the same kynge sente for me, onely to that intent (as I saide at the beginnyng) to see and here, whether I were accordyng to his expectacion.

¶ Consider also on the other parte, that my commyng into Sicile, was not to serue kynge Dionise, or to receiue by hym any commoditee, but onely to augment wisedome by addicion of knowlage. And that he desired to haue me with hym for the cause that I before haue rehersed. Wherfore it semeth that he had neede of that, which by seyng and herying of me, he trusted to knowe, that is to saie wisedome. For no man coueiteth that thynge, whiche he all redy hath, or wherof in his owne opinion he hath no nede. Now I knew partely by cõmon reporte, partely by the informacion

cion of Dion, whiche is a iuſte man and an honeſt, that kynge Dionyſe was a Tyran, that is to ſaie comen to that dignitee by vſurpacion and violence, and not by iuſte ſucceſſion or lefull election. Alſo that he was a man of quicke and ſubtile wit, but therwith he was wonderfull ſenſuall, vnſtable, and wandryng in ſondrie affections. Delityng ſomtime in voluptuous pleaſures, an other tyme in gatheryng of great treaſure and richeſſe, often times reſolued into a beaſtly rage and vengeable crueltee: About the publike weale of his countraie alwaie remiſſe, in his owne deſires ſtudious and diligent. And all this I perceiued very wel er I ſpake to hym any thynge. Onely I exerciſed my ſelfe with the Ariſtippus, Dion, and other, in ſuche parte of Philoſophie as mought induce you vnto the ſaid knowlage, wherof I haue ſpoken, approuyng alwaie my doctrine with the

 forme

forme of liuyng by the example of my maister Socrates: Abidyng opportunitee to speake, whiche mought rise of some speciall demaunde of kynge Dionyse. In the meane time to suche light questions and problemes as he did purpose, concernyng naturall causes, Rhetorike, or poetrie, or of the duetis and maners of priuate persons, I resolued them so as he helde hym contented, and delited not a litell in the forme of my reasonyng. At the laste (as I tolde the at the beginnyng) he required me to declare openly, the state and preeminence of a kynge, whiche ruled ouer other. Therat I reioiced, wenyng to haue founde the opportunitee to speake that I so longe loked for. And than forthewith I considered, that the sentence, whiche I shulde pronounce, shulde either commende and approue me for a wise man, as I was supposed to bee, or els condemne that opinion, that kynge Dionyse

nyse and other had of me, as false and vntrue: I declaryng my selfe vnworthy to haue it. I remembred also, that like as ignorance and knowlage, or yll and good maie neuer accorde: no more maie fallhoode and truthe be ioigned in one. And what so euer appereth other wise than it is in dede, it is other than truthe: and that whiche is not truthe, muste nedes be falsehode. Moreouer, as truthe is good, so falsehode is yll. Wherfore what so euer is other than truthe, can not be in a wise man, who by the consent of all men is good. Hauing full in my minde this consideracion, I described a kynge, not perchaunce as he wolde haue had me, but as truthe and the truste that he had in me cõpelled me. Therfore by the said knowlage, of the whiche we so longe haue disputed, I set out and expressed suche a man, in whom the soule had inner and full auctorite ouer the sen-

ses, and alwaie kepte the affectes in due rule and obedience, folowyng only the counsaile of Vnderstandyng, and by that gouernance was moste like vnto god. This man I called a kynge, although he had no more in his possession than had Crates the Thebane. And if that suche one were by the free consent of the people, chosen or receiued to be a principall ruler and gouernour, gouernyng them in lyke maner as he doth him selfe, than is he a great kynge or Emperour, and to be had in reuerence and honor about any mortall man, sauyng to God that excellent honor, that is due to the creator and first cause of al thynge. Not onely for the preeminence geuen vnto hym by a common consent, but also for as muche as by his knowlage, example, and authorite the people shall daily receiue of him an incōparable profite and benefite, beyng allured and prouoked by him to set their soules in

in the saide astate and authoritee, as thei maie also be kynges, & be euer like vnto god. Moreouer, this kynge by that knowlage that he hath of hym selfe, he also knoweth other men: for by the operation, whiche proceedeth of their affectes, he perceiueth howe farre thei be removed from their right place in the line of order, that is to saie, leauyng knowlage and reason, whereby thei were in the highest toppe of the line, thei descende to the places of braute beastes by participatyng with them in sensuall appetites. And than will he endeuour hym selfe by all good meanes to restore them againe (if he maie) to their proper place in Order.

¶ Also suche a kynge stablished in the saide knowlage, can neuer be deceiued by his most pernicious or mischeuous ennemies, whiche bee flatterers and glosers, by whom princes be deuoured aliue, and their soules vtterly consu-

nied with most mortal pestilence, wherwith their countreies and people be also in perill to be loste and destroied. For as soone as either in their countenes, or in their praises and dispraises, or in their owne order of liuyng, he by the saide knowlage perceiueth and noteth, to what affectes thei be inclined, he awaiteth them, and by auoiding their companie, eskapeth their snares. ¶ Finally, to the intente that the excellencie of suche a kynge shulde be more euident, like as I did set out while ere knowlage by Ignorance (for euery thinge sheweth moste perfectely, and after the common prouerbe of marchantes, best to the sale, whan it is ioigned or compared with his contrary) I began to describe a tyran, whiche in euery thynge, and (as I might saie) by rule, repugneth and is most vnlike vnto the saide kynge, whose soule ruleth not, but excludyng from hir, Knowlage

and

and Reason, suffreth hir selfe to be governed by the senses, and obeiyng to the folishe affectes, letteth them leade hir out of hir high place in the line of order, into a more base degree, and to be made equall or inferior to beastes, and to lose the figure or image of God, wherin she was created: and by that transformacion she loseth also Vnderstandyng, so that a Tyran, is willyngly taken in the saide snares, whiche a kynge doeth escape, and perceiueth not, that he is deceiued, vntyll he sensibly feeleth some greuous damage. And if any man experte in the saide knowlage, of a syncere loue, that he beareth towarde hym, wolde warne hym of the saide snares, and perchance shewe them vnto hym, as they bee laied: Yet Knowlage and Reason, the two eyes of the soule, being put out with affections, And Vnderstandynge, hyr chiefe counsailour, beyng excluded,

the man geueth no credence, but rebukyng perchance his most assured frende that warned hym, suffreth gladly hym selfe to be taken in the snare of Hypocrisie or Dissimulacion, where for lacke of libertee he shall be constraigned to abide all dangers, whiche mought happen vnto him. And he that is such one, how poore so euer he be, he is a Tyran, and if he haue rule ouer other, the more is he, vnlyke vnto God, sens by God, man is made and preserued: by crueltee and yll example man both in bodie and soule is distroied.

¶ This descripsion kynge Dionyse mought not abide to here, but thinking the time loste that I had spente for his profite, saied, that these were but wordes of ydel dotardes, wherby it semeth, that he vnderstode not my wordes. for if he had, he wolde haue thanked me, for declaryng that thynge so plainely vnto hym, whiche he had so longe desyred

syred to here, that is to saie, wisedome, whiche (as we two be agreed) consisteth in knowlage. Or elles he requyred some acte of me to be shewed, whiche agreyng with my woordes, shulde approue me to be a wise man, according to his first opinion. Howe saiest thou, was it not for one of these causes, that he spake those woordes vnto me? ARI. Yes in good faithe, I suppose that verily. PLA. We were agreed whilere, that he had nede of me, whan he sent for me, and therfore he desired to se me, and to speake with me: but whan I was with hym, although I endeuored my selfe to satisfie hym of that whiche he had nede of, & so muche desired: yet if he did not understande what I saied, in dede my woordes were in vaie. I put case Aristippus, that one of the philosophers of Inder, or of other countraies speakyng no greeke, had come vnto him, whom he woulde haue

re-

required by an interpretour to haue taught hym wisedome, howe shulde he haue instructed kynge Dionyse to haue satisfied his gentill desire? ARI. How els but by an interpretour. PLA. What if Zeno Eleates, after that he had bit of his owne tongue, and spit it in the face of the tyran that tourmented hym, had bene sente for to kynge Dionyse, whom he wolde haue desyred to teche hym wisedome, howe shoulde Zeno, whiche lacked his tongue, satisfie the request of so good a prince and so well disposed? ARIS. I knowe not howe, excepte it shulde be by signes and tokens: Whiche were a diffuse waie to instructe a man in so high a lernyng. PLA. Yes, he mought door it sooner by writyng. ARI. Ye that is truthe. But I ment the answering his demande without any tariyng. PLA. Yet than perchaunce, he shuld also haue nede of an interpretour

that

that knewe his tokens, leste kynge Dionyse, whiche had not bene vsed vnto them, shulde not vnderstande what he ment by them. But supposest thou Aristippus, that any man can better interprete an other mans sentence, either spoken in a strange language, or signified by tokens, than I coulde expounde myne owne intent or meaning? ARI. May surely. For euery wise man is of his owne sentence the beste expositour. PLA. And if it be expouned sufficiently in a fewe woordes, it is the more commendable. ARI. Be that is sure. PLA. Mought I haue vsed any plainer and shorter waie and in fewer woordes, than kynge Dionyse reproued me with, to remēbre him, that in his owne woordes he mought deprehende that thing that he sought for, sens that, whiche I spake before, was in his owne language, and therfore he vnderstode the woordes sufficiently: and yf ther were

were any thynge, whiche he vnderstode not, it was in the sentence. ARIS. What meanest thou therby? PLA. Mary I wyll tell thee. In the definicion of a kynge I instructed hym, howe he mought be in the highest dignitee nerte vnto God, and also in moste perfecte suretee, whiche was no small benefite of so poore a persone as I am, to giue to a prince. Wherefore if the eies of kynge Dioyse soule, Knowlage and Reason, had not ben out, he shulde soone haue perceiued the saide benefite, and like a noble man haue geuen to me thankes, whiche I well deserued. And in the description of a Tyran I warned hym of all dangers, wherby he mought lose the saide dignitee. In the whiche two declaracions was wholly comprehended all that, for the whiche he so muche desired to se me. And all this while I knewe not, but that he had ben a good man,

be

because he desired to knowe that, whi-
che thou haste granted is good, that is
to saie, wisedome. Nowe whan he
gaue not to me condigne thankes, as
my benefite deserued, but accompted
me to haue ben idle, whiles I instruc-
ted him, than it semed, that *Vnderstan-
dyng* was absēt and fled from the soule,
and that he ruled not as a kynge, but
that he was ruled by his affectiōs. wher-
fore his ingratitude declared, his wor-
des to sauour of tiranny: whiche I re-
hersed vnto him, to thintent that he per-
ceiuyng by my wordes in what perill
he was, mought by the remembryng
of my firste instruction concernyng a
kynge, reuoke againe vnderstandyng,
and subduyng the affectes, be eftesones
restored vnto his dignitee. Nowe sai-
est thou, consyderyng well all that,
which is before saied, were my wordes
yll, as they were spoken? ARI. Naie,
as thou haste declared them, but yet me

se-

semeth, thei were very sharpe. PLA. Protest thou what maketh the to thinke so? because they were shorte. But thou muste consider, that he that lacketh, in that whiche he doeth lacke, he is inferiour to him, of whom he desireth it. Wherfore in as muche as kynge Dionyse to haue benefite of me, became my hirer, he was inferiour vnto me. And therfore respectes ought to be alwaie had to that, whereunto the reason extendeth, and not to the astate of the persone that hireth: And that I alwaie considered. And therfore spake I as I did to kynge Dionyse. Yet did I it with suche a temperance, that if he had not bene a Tyran in deede, he wolde neuer haue ben discontented. For I did not cal him a tyran, or reproched him of any tyrannye: But only saied, that his wordes sauored of tyrannie.

¶ I put the case thou gauest to me wine out of a vessel, and whan I had dronke

of

of it, I wold sai, that it had a sent of mustines, it argueth not, that the vessell is mustie. For perchance within fiue or sixe daies, that sent will be gone, & the wine wil drinke clene & gentilly. And therfore I suppose, for my wordes thou wouldest not be angrie. What if that kynge Dionyse had desyred me to teche him Rhetorike: And whan I herde him declame, or sawe his writyng, If I findyng any faute in his word? wolde warne him in this wise: Syr your wordes do sauour of to much arrogance, or that thei sauored of sewet or peintyng, or be lyke vnto apples of the dead so, whiche be delicate in colour without, but within there is nothyng but coles and powder vnsauery. Reuokyng hym therby to such rules as I had before rad vnto hym, wherby yf he wold be diligent, he shuld brynge the forme of speakyng and writyng into a perfection. Supposest thou, that this maner of instruction shulde

prouoke kynge Dionyse to be angrie with me? ARI. No, for it were no reason. PLA. Than hath he not so sharpe a witte as thou haste supposed, seing he perceiueth not, howe muche the lerning of wisedome exceedeth the lerning of Rhetorike. And therfore he that teacheth wisdome, ought to be of a greatter auctorite, than he whiche techeth Rhetorike. And therfore seing thou doest confesse, that kynge Dionyse in lerning Rhetorike wolde take in good worthe, what so euer I wolde saie, in correcting his wordes concerning eloquence: howe muche more ought he than to take in good parte these wordes, that I spake in correctig his wordes, whereby he semed to refuse wisedom, which a litle before he so much couaited to here declared? And one thing mought haue contented hym: that all that I had spoken, was at his desire, and for his commodite. Where

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if I had purposed to haue gotten any thynge by him, my wit was not so single, but that I knewe, howe to speake wordes as well as thou, whiche shulde delite him. But whan he demed me to be a wise man, he with that opinion bounde me, that I coulde not deceiue him. ARI. In good feithe and that is very well spoken. But peraduenture thou spakest to soone. And if thou hadst forborne a daie, two, or three, vntill his fume had ben passed, & that he had vsed eftsones with thee some familiaritee: peraduenture thy woordes wolde haue ben more easily taken, and thervnto thou shuldest haue founden more oportunitee. PLA. But take one thynge with the Aristippus. In the office of a wise man, that worde, Peraduenture, is neuer herde spoken: No more than in the ende of his workes these wordes, Had I wiste. For he hath alwaie the thre times in remembrance, Time pre-

Peraduenture. Had I wiste.

sent, tyme passed, and time to come. And referryng all thynge to necessarie causes, or (as I saied longe a gone) vnto Prouidence, reputeth nothyng to Fortune. Therfore the deferryng of tyme shulde haue nothyng auailed, but rather shoulde haue ben the cause of muche damage. ARI. How so I praie thee? PLA. Take hede, and I shall tell thee. Thou hast graunted all redy, that kynge Dionyse desired to se me, to the intent that in beholdyng and heryng me, he mought perceiue, whether I wer a wise man or no: and than desiryng me to describe vnto him the excellencie of a kynge, supposest not thou, that he made that requeste vnto me for some laudable purpose? ARI. Yes doubtles. PLA. Thinkyng that by no question he mought either proue me more sooner to be a wise man, or els that he might lerne more wisedome. ARI. I thinke bothe for the one and the other.

PLA

PLA. Thou haſt not denied hitherto, but that wiſedome, whiche kynge Dionyſe ſuppoſed to be in me, is in the knowlage that I haue declared: what remained than to proue me to be a wiſe man? doeſt not thou remembre, that we were agreed while ere, that it was operacion? ARI. Yes mary doe I. PLA. And that operacion was parte of that, whiche kynge Dionyſe deſyred to knowe, and not onely parte, but alſo the principall portion. ARI. It hath hitherto agreed ſo with reaſon. PLA. If I had holde my peace, and ſaide nothyng, after that kynge Dionyſe had ſpoken, what ſhulde haue enſued of all myne inſtruction? ARI. I ſuppoſe nothyng. For he woulde haue let the departe without thanke or damage, and that whiche thou hadſt ſpoken, ſhulde haue bene lightly forgotten. PLA. And than his wordes had bene verified, that my wordes had bene ydelly ſpo-

ken. But howe ſaieſt thou, ſuppoſeſt thou, that he ſaied truely? ARI. Maie in good faithe. For me ſemeth, that thy deſcription of a kynge was wonderfull true and neceſſarie, and alſo therin was the knowlage, wherof thou haſte treated compendiouſly, and plainely declared. And me thinketh, that the woordes that kynge Dionyſe ſpake, beſemed not a kynge, but were muche rather the woordes of one that lacked that knowlage, wherin is wiſedome. PLA. Nowe I am glad Ariſtippus, that I fynde in thee ſo muche conformitee in reaſon. Than ſens theſe vngentill woordes of kynge Dionyſe beſemed not a kynge to ſpeake, it appereth that thei beſemed hym that was contrarie vnto a kynge, whiche is a Tyran. And beyng the woordes of one that lacked knowlage, it accordeth alſo, that thei were the woordes of one that was ignorant, and Ignorance is moſte contrarie to wiſe-

dome,

dome, and as I haue ſaid tranſformeth a man into a beaſt or a monſtre. But what Ignorance is it, that thou ſuppoſeſt by the ſaide woordes was declared to be in kynge Dionyſe? ARI. What other, but that ignorãce, wherby he knew not himſelfe. PLA. And what ſuppoſeſt thou, that he was, whan he ſpake (as thou haſt granted) woordes that beſeemed a Tyran? ARI. what els, but as thou haſt reherſed. PLA. What a Tyran Ariſtippus? thou ſpeakeſt nowe more plainely than I did. God forbede that I ſhulde ſuffre ſo gentle a prince to be transformed in to ſuche a monſtre, if I coulde helpe hym. But I praie thee, whiche benefite woldeſt thou preferre either that, whiche is geuen or employed furthwith, or that whiche is lenger differred? ARI. What queſtion is that? That kyndenes or benefite, that is moſte prompte or ſooneſt employed, is to be chieffly eſteemed. PLA. Than if

 furth-

furthwith and as soone as I perceiued the transformacion of gentil kynge Dionyse, I endeuoured my selfe to make hym to knowe by his owne woordes, what he was: whereby if he wouldc, he mought by the expellyng of Ignorance haue bene not onely restored vnto the forme of a man: but also haue bene made a great Emperour by the well vsyng of his dignitee. Supposest not thou, that I did as it became me? and for that benefite so soone offred, was I not worthie a great gramercie? ARI. Yes, if he wolde haue so taken it. But er thou camest to hym, thou knewest by credible reporte, that he was obstinately inclined to all vicious affections, and therwith impacient and cruell, wherfore whan thou didst perceiue, that he contemned thy doctrine, thou shuldest than haue ceassed, and not haue offred thy selfe to perill without hope of benefite. PLA. That aduantage onely

thou

thou haſt of me Ariſtippus: for thou that doeſt profeſſe pleaſure, moughteſt haue done ſo lefully: but I that haue profeſſed wiſedome and vertue, mought by no meanes haue done it. For if I had not replied vnto him, I had lefte that vndeclared, whiche he required to knowe, whiche by his owne wordes, as by an example in other artes or ſciences, was plainely ſet out and expreſſed. And like wiſe as I knewe, that he was impacient and cruell: ſo more certainely I knewe, that he had no power to indamage my ſoule, by whoſe operacion I was called a wiſe man. And if I ſhulde haue holden my peace than, it ſhulde haue bene for feare of damage, whiche mought happen by his impacience and crueltee towarde my bodie, than ſhulde I haue proued my ſelfe to haue ben a foole and no wiſe man, that I had not holden my peace at the beginnyng, and than ſhulde kynge Dio-

nyse haue founde no cause to haue taken displesure. But sens he desired to knowe, if I were a wise man, and for that opinion, that he had in me, he fauored me: And also thou doest confesse, that my description of a kynge by his definicion, and also by comparyng him to his contrarie, conteined that knowlage, wherin is wisedome: nowe remained nothyng, but operacion to proue me to be a wise man. Wherfore contemnyng or littell regardyng that vaine feare, to bringe kynge Dyonise to knowlage, whiche he desyred, declared, that my mynde was not subiecte to corporall passions, and consequently not to sensuall affections, which mought haue incensed or stered me to speake that thing, that mought haue pleased kynge Dionyse appetite, whiche was corrupte and vicious, hopyng to haue had thereby preferment and singular fauour: And herein began the operacion, whiche

agreed

agreed with my saide knowlage. And afterwarde by takyng libertee from me, and makyng me a slaue, he more declared my wordes to be true, and therby had the larger example, wherby he mought the better haue knowen hymself. And after whan he herde (as I doubte not but that he hath) howe constantly I contemned the perill that I was in, of my life at Egina: he mought well perceiue, that operation in patience to agree with my knowlage. And therby he had fully all that knowlage of me, wherfore he desired to se me. where contrariwise, if I shulde haue holden my peace, as well my comyng to kynge Dionyse had bene frustrate and vayne, and his gentyll desire had bene vnsatisfied, as also by my silēce beyng thought (as reason was that I shulde bee) to be subdued either with fere or affection: I shuld seeme to condemne mine owne doctrine, wherfore I shoulde be demed

vn-

vnworthy that good opinion, that kyng Dionyse had of me. ARI. Well Plato, in suche experience of wisedome I wyll not folowe thee. PLA. Therfore whan any aduersitee shall happen vnto thee, as I suppose thou hast not fortune locked faste in a coffar no more than had Crœsus the riche kynge of Lydia: for all that he thought, that all goddes and men were his friendes, and yet was he openly bourned by Cyrus, whom he litteli feared. Thou shalt feele both aduersitee and greefe, & also make thy soule subiecte vnto thy senses, wherof what doeth folowe, thou dost yet remembre what we haue alredie discussed. Where I or any other by the saied knowlage and operation therunto ioigned, shalbe so armed against aduersitee that what so euer the bodie feeleth, yet the very man, whiche is the soule, feeleth no disease, or as I mought saie, is neuer inquieted, but is euer intiere

and

and in his true proporcion and figure: that is to saie, like vnto God. And also shall haue the price, that he hath deserued, by vanquishyng of his aduersarie, that is to saie, corporall disease or aduersitee. But nowe Aristippus, sens by any thynge that hath hapned I neuer fell from that place in the line of order, wherin God had set me, but my mynde was euer in one state and condicion, and there as it was at my commyng into Sicile, there it hath hitherto euer continued, maiest thou reasonably saie, that I was euer losse, in so muche as I was neuer transformed or out of that astate, where in a wise man ought alwaie to be? ARIS. No in good faith, as it now semeth. PLA. What saiest thou than by kynge Dionyse? Whom instructyng to knowe hym selfe, I thus much displeased, and in stede of thanke and preferment, hath rewarded me with danger and bon-

dage.

dage? ARI. On my faithe I thinke, that he hath bothe loste him selfe, by refusyng the saide knowlag, wherby he shoulde haue bene deliuered from the saide transformacion, and also he hath moste foolishly loste the Plato, in puttyng the from hym, which by thy counsaile shuldest haue ben to hym so royall a treasure, and the same dooe I thinke also of Polides the ambassadour, and of the Egenites. PLA. Gramercie Aristippus for thy gentill audience: now be we come to the towne, and haue made a good ende bothe of our iourney and also of our communicacion. ARI. Fare well Plato, and for my parte I wolde not haue lacked it for the horse that I ryde on. And to saie the truthe, it hath made me to change somewhat of mine olde opinion. PLA. The nexte tyme that we mete I wyll make thee to change all, if thou wilt here and abide reason.

FINIS.

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